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I. INTRODUCTION 
In two recent decisions, California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial 
Council (CCRA I/ and California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial 
Council (CCRA I[)' ---collectively "the CCRA decisions"-the First 
District Court of Appeal of California appeared to deliver the coup de 
grace to using electronic recording in California superior court to make 
a verbatim record of proceedings. In CCRA I, the court considered the 
Judicial Council rules of court that expressly authorized superior courts 
to use sound and video recording devices to make the verbatim record, 
the "Electronic Recording Rules,"' and it declared these rules invalid.' 
I. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995) [hereinafter CCRA ]]. 
2. 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997) [hereinafter CCRA 11]. 
3. CAL. R. CT. 33(e), 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997); CAL. R. Cr. 891, 892 [all 
four rules hereinafter the ELECTRONIC RECORDING RULES]. 
4. See CCRA l, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56. On January 31, 1997, the Judicial Council 
repealed Rules 33(e) and 980.3 and revised Rules 891 and 892. See CAL. R. CT. 33(e), 
980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997); CAL. R. Cr. 891,892. 
48 
[VOL. 37: 47, 2000] A Tale of Two Counties 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
In CCRA II, the court flatly declared that the Legislature prohibited "the 
creation of an official superior court record by electronic means under 
any circumstances,"5 and affirmed the trial court's injunction that 
"restrains the Judicial Council ... from authorizing and from causing the 
expenditure of public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a 
nonstenographic method and system for preparing the official verbatim 
record of superior court proceedings. "6 
Despite these explicit holdings, California courts remain uncertain as 
to whether they have the authority to use non-stenographic' means to 
make a verbatim record of general jurisdiction proceedings' without 
express statutory authorization. This uncertainty is made apparent by 
the widely divergent responses of the superior courts in Los Angeles and 
5. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53 I ( emphasis added). 
6. Id. at 530-31. The court wrote, "The trial court correctly interpreted CCRA I to 
mean precisely what we held when it crafted paragraphs 2, 4 and 6 of the injunction." 
Id. at 531. 
7. "Stenography" is defined as "the art or process of writing in shorthand." 
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1155 (1989). "Shorthand" is defined 
as: "I: a method of writing rapidly by substituting characters, abbreviations, or symbols 
for leners, sounds, words, or phrases ... 2: a system or instance of rapid or abbreviated 
communication." Id. at 1090. 
8. In California, municipal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction while superior 
courts are courts of general jurisdiction. See 2 B.E. WITKIN, CAL. PROC. §§ 209-10, 249 
(4th ed. 1996). Section 72194.5 of the California Government Code expressly authorizes 
a municipal court to use electronic recording whenever an official court reporter is 
unavailable. See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 72194.5 (West Supp. 1999). No statute expressly 
authorizes or prohibits superior courts from electronically recording their proceedings. 
Under Proposition 220, passed by the voters on June 2, 1998, 54 out of 58 counties 
abolished their municipal courts and established unified county-wide superior courts. 
See Judicial Council of California, News Release: Fifty-Four California Counties Vote to 
Unify Trial Courts, Sept. 24, 1999 (visited Jan. 8, 2000) <www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 
newsreleases/NR56-99.htm>. Senate Bill 2139, enacted in 1998 to implement trial court 
unification in counties that so elect, was intended "to preserve the status quo through the 
unification process," including the legal status of electronic recording to make the court 
record. Bill Analysis, S.B. 2139, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), available at 
California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000) 
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb_2 I 39 _cfa_ 19980830_214559 _sen_ 
floor.him> (emphasis added). Senate Bill 2139 specifies that court unification does not 
"change the extent to which court reporter services or electronic reporting may be used 
in the courts." Act of Sept. 28, 1998, ch. 931, sec. 507, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5101, 
5308 (West) (S.B. 2139). Therefore, electronk recording is still expressly authorized 
under section 72194.5 "in a limited civil case, or a misdemeanor or infraction case." 
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 72194.5 (West Supp. 1999). In this Article, the phrase "general 
jurisdiction proceeding" refers to a civil proceeding over which only the superior court 
had jurisdiction prior to court unification. Section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure, as amended under Senate Bill 2139, refers to such a proceeding as a "civil 
case other than a limited civil case." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999). 
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Orange Counties to the CCRA decisions and to a January 1997 Judicial 
Council directive prohibiting the expenditure of state funds on electronic 
recording to make the official record in superior court.' After years of 
fighting to preserve the option of litigants and judges to choose 
electronic recording as a cheaper alternative to shorthand, 10 the Los 
Angeles Superior Court," at the end of 1997, shut down its sound 
recording equipment." Meanwhile, across the county line in Orange 
County, thirteen courtrooms 13 continued to videotape general jurisdiction 
proceedings financed by county funds and user fees until September 27, 
1999." Litigants who chose video recording to make a verbatim record 
9. See Memorandum from William C. Vickrey, Administrative Director of the 
Courts, Judicial Council of California, to All Presiding and Sole Judges of the Superior 
Courts et al. (Jan. 10, 1997) (on file with author). 
IO. See William E. Hewitt, Video Court Reporting: A Primer for Trial and 
Appellate Judges, 31 JUDGES' J. 2, 4 (1992) ("[W]hen compared with stenographic 
reporting, video court reporting produces an instantly available form of the record that is 
very inexpensive. A videotape may be purchased from the court for about $20 while a 
comparable transcript may cost from $400 to $800."). 
11. As late as May 1996, Los Angeles County endorsed the practice of electronic 
recording in superior court. See Stephen BirdJebough, Bill Analysis, at 3-4, A.B. 21! 3, 
1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill 
Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ 
ab_2101-2150/ab_2113_cfa_960506_162617 _asm_comm.html>. This document states: 
Los Angeles County reports that four courtrooms have video, and 69 have 
audio recording equipment. Restoring these courts to stenography-based 
systems would require the hiring of some 90 court reporters, and displacement 
of about an equal number of electronic recording monitors and supervisory 
personnel. The transition cost would be about $8,000,000. The ongoing added 
cost due to the higher salaries paid to stenographers is estimated at $3,900,000 
per year. 
The Court of Appeal in Los Angeles reports that 588 of the 1892 
transcripts which the court received in 1995 were derived in part using audio 
or video recordings and that records derived from electronic recording are 
indistinguishable from the stenographic records. 
Id. at 3-4. As late as July 19%, after the CCRA I decision but before Judge Garcia 
issued his injunction that was affirmed in CCRA ll, the Los Angeles Superior Court 
"continued to use tape recorders instead of shorthand reporters as a cost-saving 
measure." Robert Greene, Supervisors Approve Contracts for Electronic Recording in 
Superior Court, ME1RO. NEWS-ENTER., July JI, 1996, at 5 ("The [Los Angeles] Superior 
Court and county counsel contend that electronic monitoring continues to be allowed in 
court so long as neither party requests a stenographic court reporter."). 
12. The lone exception is Judge Kurt Lewin, who continues to use electronic 
recording. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Stenographers Fight for Their Day (Jobs) in Court, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1999, at BI (calling Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Lewin 
"one of a handful of state judges who have persisted in using tape recording despite 
persistent protests from the [Judicial Council] and the stenographers' trade group"). 
13. See Letter from Pat Hill, Executive Director, Civil Operations and Special 
Services, Orange County Superior Court, to author (Aug. 13, 1999) (on file with author). 
The practice in these 13 courtrooms is to use "electronic recording in general jurisdiction 
civil cases when neither party objects." Id. 
14. See Memorandum from Kathleen E. O'Leary, Presiding Judge, Orange County 
Superior Court, to Judges Bauer et al. (Sept. 21, 1999) (on file with author). A telephone 
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paid $80.00 for a full day of video recording instead of $357 .00 for a full 
day of shorthand reporting." 
The Orange County Superior Court pulled the plug on electronic 
recording to make the "official verbatim record" in response to a "formal 
request" by the Judicial Council, which was contained in a September 
15, 1999 letter from the Administrative Director of the Courts, William 
Vickrey, to the Presiding Judge of Orange County Superior Court, 
Kathleen O'Leary." In that letter, the Administrative Director stated that 
Orange County Superior Court's practice of funding electronic recording 
through local user fees-not state funds allocated by the Judicial 
Council-violated the trial court's injunction in CCRA II restraining the 
Judicial Council from "authorizing or causing the expenditure of 'public 
funds "'17 to support electronic recording to make the official record." 
survey of the superior courts in each county in California, conducted by research 
assistants John Palmer and Richard Helms, revealed that superior courts in an 
overwhelming majority of counties do not electronically record general jurisdiction 
proceedings. This survey was completed on September 1, 1999, before the Orange 
County Superior Court terminated its use of electronic recording to make an official 
record in general jurisdiction and felony proceedings on September 27, 1999. According 
to the survey, superior courts of the following counties do not currently employ 
electronic recording to make a verbatim record (those with an asterisk having used 
electronic recording as part of an electronic recording demonstration project-discussed 
infra notes 85-96-that terminated on January 1, 1994): Alameda,* Alpine, Butte, 
Calaveras, Colusa, Contra Costa,* Del Norte, El Dorado, Fresno, Humboldt, Imperial, 
Inyo, Kem, Lake, Los Angeles,* Madera, Marin, Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, 
Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Riverside,* San Benito, San 
Diego,* San Francisco, San Joaquin,* San Luis Obispo, San Mateo,* Santa Barbara, 
Santa Clara,• Santa Cruz,• Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Solano,• Sonoma, Stanislaus, 
Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Ventura, Yolo, and Yuba. The Lassen 
County Superior Court tapes proceedings for the clerk and the judge; parties can obtain a 
copy for $10. In the superior courts of Amador and Kings counties, the court has the 
discretion to grant the petition of the parties to electronically record proceedings. The 
use of electronic recording in San Barnardino County Superior Court varies by 
department. Until September 27, 1999, 13 courtrooms in Orange County Superior Court 
used electronic recording to make the verbatim record if neither party objected. The 
researchers could not connect with court personnel in Glenn County. Survey results are 
on file with the author. 
15. See Orange County Superior Court Fee Schedule (visited Jul. 14, 1999) 
<http:www.oc.ca.gov/superior/rcdfees.htm> (effective Jan. 1, 1999). 
16. See Letter from William C. Vickrey, Administrative Director of the Courts, 
Judicial Council of California, to Kathleen E. O'Leary, Presiding Judge, Orange County 
Superior Court (Sept. 15, 1999) (on file with author). 
17. Id. at 2 (paraphrasing CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529,531 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
18. See Letter from William C. Vickrey, supra note 16, at 1-2. Vickrey wrote: 
Your letter states that the court is paying for electronic recording with 
funds other than the monies allocated by the Judicial Council, including funds 
from the sale of videotapes and a portion of filing fees received by the court. 
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Sacramento County Superior Court still uses electronic recording in 
Family Law, and Civil Law, and Motion proceedings, including general 
jurisdiction cases." 
This Article explores the authority of superior courts to use electronic 
recording technology to make a verbatim record of superior court 
proceedings-without express statutory authorization-in the aftermath 
of the CCRA decisions. Rather than just arguing that the CCRA 
decisions were wrongly decided,20 this Article explores ways to narrowly 
construe the CCRA opinions to permit superior courts and their litigants 
to use rapidly evolving electronic recording technologies as an 
alternative to traditional stenographic court reporting. 
Part II articulates the challenging statutory interpretation problem 
raised by the CCRA decisions. The California Court Reporters 
Association (CCRA) maintains a powerful lobby in the California 
Legislature that has blocked numerous efforts to update nineteenth 
century court reporting statutes by expressly authorizing the courts to 
Your letter asks that we let you know if we believe that this use of funds 
violates the council's directives on this issue. 
As you know, the council has issued a directive that "superior courts may 
not use any funds allocated by the Judicial Council for electronic recording to 
make the official verbatim record, except in limited civil cases, misdemeanors, 
and infractions, as allowed by Government Code section 72194.5." The 
council's directive also states that this prohibition applies even if the amounts 
involved are small, "and even if the funds are recouped through charges to the 
litigants or payments by a county or other source." 
Based on your description of your court's activities in this area, we 
conclude that those activities are of necessity linked with activities paid for by 
state trial court funding, and, hence, are not in compliance with the council's 
directive. 
In addition, please note that the judgment states that the council is 
enjoined from authorizing or causing the expenditure of "public funds" for the 
prohibited uses of electronic recording. 
Thus, the use of any public funds for these purposes is inconsistent with 
the judgment, and the council could not and does not authorize or approve of 
your court's use of public funds for these purposes. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
I 9. See Telephone Interview with Mike Roddy, Chief Executive Officer, 
Sacramento County Superior Court (Nov. 30, 1999). 
20. For a detailed discussion of the errors in the CCRA opinions, see generally 
Glenn S. Koppel, When Push-Comes-to-Shove Between Court Rule and Statute: The 
Role of Judicial Interpretation in Court Administration, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. I 03 
[hereinafter Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove]. The article argues that the CCRA court 
made two significant errors. First, the court interpreted too broadly the text of article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution, which defines the Judicial Council's rulemaking 
power. See id. at I 40-70. Second, the court interpreted too broadly the text of various 
applicable statutes. See id. at 170-85. The CCRA I court had characterized these statutes 
as comprising a "statutory scheme ... [that] suggest[s] that the Legislature implicitly 
intended that [the official] record be made by certified shorthand reporters rather than by 
electronic recording." CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 51 (Ct. App. 1995). 
52 
[VOL 37: 47, 2000) A Tale of Two Counties 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
use twentieth century electronic court recording technologies in general 
jurisdiction proceedings.21 A cursory reading of these statutes makes it 
appear as though the Legislature has thoughtfully considered-and 
rejected-the use of newer, cutting edge technologies to make the court 
record. Part II then surveys the statutory and case law landscape to lay a 
foundation for Part III' s analysis of the current legal status of electronic 
recording in California superior courts. Finally, Part II explores the 
unintended role played by the advent of state court funding-
accomplished by a 1997 statute22-in shutting down electronic recording 
in Los Angeles Superior Court and thereby undermining judicial self-
govemance. 
Part III analyzes the current legal status of electronic recording in 
superior courts in California. The Article concludes in Part IV that the 
practice of videotaping superior court proceedings in Orange County 
was not inconsistent with applicable statutes. This Article steers clear of 
the debate whether shorthand or electronic recording is the better 
method for making the verbatim record. Studies indicate that there is no 
superior method; each has its plusses and minuses." Indeed, there is no 
perfectly reliable means of making a verbatim record. As observed by 
the Second District Court of Appeal in 1998, "In fact, the battle over use 
of certified shorthand reporters versus electronic recording appears to be 
more political than factual. "24 
21. See Dan Walters, Luddites in the Court: Are Reporters Losing Their War 
Against Machines?, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 21, 1993, at 6. The reporter stated: 
Id. 
The California Court Reporters Association has become one of the 
Capitol's most effective single-purpose lobbying groups, [its] lone goal being 
to keep tape out of the state's courtrooms. 
Frank Murphy, a one-time Republican assemblyman from Santa Cruz 
who has lobbied for the court reporters for years, is famous for his ability to 
sniff out and kill any bill that would bring electronic recording to the 
courtroom. 
22. See Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding and Improvement Act of 1997, ch. 
850, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4737 (West) (A.B. 233). 
23. See Memorandum from Rae Lovko and Susan Myers, National Center for 
State Courts, Institute for Court Management (Mar. 15, 1994) (on file with author) 
("[The findings reported in 20 evaluations of electronic court reporting] reveal that while 
no technology is unquestionably superior in all respects or under all circumstances, audio 
recording and video recording are viable court reporting methods."); see also 
INFORMATION SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SUMMARY OF 
LITERATURE ON ELECTRONIC COURT REPORTING ( 1994 ). 
24. People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 745 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Don J. 
DeBenedictis, Excuse Me, Did You Get All That?, 79 A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 84). 
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This Article addresses the key question: Who should decide what role 
technology should play (1) in court administration generally, and (2) 
more specifically, in making the court record?25 The decision should not 
be made by persons with a vested interest in status quo technology-
persons who, by virtue of their entrenched position in that technology, 
have the political power in the Legislature to take away the courts' and 
litigants' power to choose. 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING IN 
CALIFORNIA COURTS 
A. The Government Failure Problem: Court Reporters Have 
Used Legislative Lobbying Leverage to "Fossilize" 
by Statute the Shorthand Method, Thereby 
Depriving the Courts and the Public of Their 
Power to Choose New Technologies 
to Make the Record 
Technology for preparing a verbatim record of court proceedings has 
come a long way from the 1860s when routine court reporting made its 
debut in American courtrooms. At that time, the first court 
stenographers used the quill pen" to take down notes in shorthand.27 
25. This Article's answer corresponds to that offered in the Final Report of the 
Legislature's Electronic Recording Project Advisory Committee-ironically, a document 
written by persons appointed at the insistence of the California Court Reporters 
Association. See SENATE COMM, ON JUDICIARY, ELECTRONIC REcORDINGNIDEO 
TAPING-EXPERIMENTAL USE IN SUPERIOR COURT 5, 1985-1986 Leg .• Reg. Sess. (Cal 
1986) (A.B. 825); see also Hearing on A.B. 825 Before the Assembly Comm. on 
Judiciary, 1985-1986 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995). The Final Report of the Legislature's 
Electronic Recording Project Advisory Committee concluded: "In civil litigation, a 
litigant should be able to choose the record making system at the litigant's cost. . . . In 
civil litigation, it should be the litigant's decision which method (ER or CSR) will be 
used to make the record." ELECTRONIC RECORDING PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE ELECTRONIC RECORDING PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITIBE 1, 7 
(1992) (on file with author). 
26. See Harry M. Scharf, The Court Reponer, 10 J. LEGAL HIST, 191, 209 (1989). 
Scharf s article includes the following quotation: 
The early shorthand writer, of course, wrote with quill pens. Of these he 
carried into court with him a goodly supply in a leather case, and also an ink 
bottle in a metal case covered with leather. Part of the equipment of his 
chambers was a proper penknife and a hone, for he had to cut his pens to suit 
his hand. , 
Id. (quoting TREMAINE WRIGHT, THE Two ANGELS); see also Brian Miller, Coun 
Reponing: From Stenography to Technology, Gov'T TECH. I (Mar. 1996) 
<http://www.govtech.net/publications/ gt/1996/marlcourts/courts.shtm> ("[The court 
reporters'] tools have changed over the centuries from inkwells to stenograph machines, 
and more recently to today's computer-aided transcription, or CAT."). 
27. Stenographers were rarely used as court reporters to make a verbatim record of 
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During the last twenty years, sophisticated electronic court reporting 
technology has evolved rapidly. Currently, court proceedings are 
routinely recorded in many American courtrooms" through the medium 
of multi-track audio and videotape," as well as cutting-edge, digital 
technology.'° Moreover, voice recognition computer technology that 
will translate voice to text is on the horizon.'1 As courts throughout the 
trial proceedings in American courtrooms until the mid-nineteenth century. See Jim 
Haviland, Philander Deming's Role, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12, 1982, at 15 ("Until just after 
the Civil War, testimony wasn't recorded in trials. This led to considerable wrangling 
over the different recollections of what had been said by witnesses in court."). 
28. According to a 1993 survey prepared jointly by the Conference of State Court 
Administrators and the National Center for State Courts, 45 state court systems, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the federal courts either "allow" or "require" the 
use of audio tape to record some or all trial proceedings. Video tape is "allowed" in 17 
state jurisdictions, "prohibited" in 7 state jurisdictions, and "experimental for some or all 
types of cases" in 10 state jurisdictions and in the federal courts. DA vm B. ROTTMAN ET 
AL., STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1993, tbl.31 (1995). 
29. Thirteen courtrooms in Orange County Superior Court are equipped with 
videotape recording equipment. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. William E. 
Hewitt, Senior Court Research Associate for the National Center for State Courts in 
Williamsburg, Virginia, describes video court reporting as follows: 
Video court reporting captures the sights and sounds in a courtroom on 
videotape, without a camera operator. In a typical courtroom five to seven 
cameras and about the same number of microphones are required to record the 
proceedings. The cameras are mounted on the walls or ceilings. They are 
unobtrusive-no special lighting is required .... 
The cameras are "sound activated" and controlled by a computerized 
mixing device. This "brain" of the system ... adjusts the sound level of the 
audio output and determines which microphone and camera position will have 
precedence at any one time. It allows the camera to switch between speakers. 
A video court reporting system includes a "date/time generator," which 
displays the current date and time on the monitor and on the tape. The display 
of the date and the time of day is used in place of transcript page and line 
numbers to locate and refer to portions of the record. 
Hewitt, supra note 10, at 3. 
30. A commentator explains: 
[Digital technology permits m]icrophones at the podiums, the judge's chair, 
attorneys' tables, and in the ceiling [to] record high-quality digital sound 
straight to a computer hard drive on separate tracks. Court reporters register 
who is speaking with a keystroke, creating an annotated log that's stored with 
the audio record. When a judge asks for a statement to be replayed for a court, 
a few keystrokes accomplish the task in seconds. 
John Southers!, Digital Court Recording: Trial Without Error, CT. TECH. BULL., Mar.-
Apr. 1998, at 1, 8. 
31. See April C. Argtegian, The Technology-Augmented Court Record (visited Jan. 
8, 2000) <http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ncsc/tis/ctc5/203.htm>. Argtegian wrote in 
preparation for the Fifth National Court Technology Conference (CTC5) of the National 
Center for State Courts: 
Does the future hold automated voice and speech recognition systems in 
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nation seek to infuse court operations with cost-cutting, cutting-edge 
technology to cope with tight fiscal restraints, the court reporting 
profession resists, with varying success, non-stenographic inroads on the 
court record." 
The California Legislature has proven to be a particularly hospitable 
environment for court reporters to promote their professional interests. 
which the reporter's duties are primarily to assure the proper functioning of the 
system? Logic suggests that this is likely, but technology advances in this area 
have been slower than anticipated. The task necessary to achieve an 
automated system is tremendous. We must have a computer that not only can 
recognize a huge number of words but which can handle similar sounding 
words, accents, colds, and unusual speaking patterns-to mention only a few 
factors. Professor Lederer, the Director of Courtroom 21, has predicted that 
science and engineering will one day achieve this goal, and that then reporters 
will likely expand their duties to become courtroom technologists as well. 
This may be, but the task facing voice and speech recognition specialists is so 
great that even if he is correct, that time will not likely come for many years 
indeed. 
Id; see also Frederick K. Grittner, The Recording on Appeal: Minnesota's Experience 
with Videotaped Proceedings, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 593, 607 (1993). Grittner 
writes: 
Id. 
The continued development of technology should be treated as a 
fundamental assumption. Voice recognition computer systems appear 
attainable. Voice-activated computers are now marketed to doctors and to 
attorneys as a means of bypassing secretaries and transcribers. Although these 
systems require a user to dictate hundreds of phrases so the machine can 
analyze the voice pattern, engineers are continuing to improve speech 
recognition. 
32. Court reporter lobbying is a national phenomenon. See Jacobs, supra note 12, 
at B 1 ("Last year alone, the National Court Reporters Association spent $320,000 on 
lobbying."). Such lobbying is a manifestation of a larger problem of the erosion of 
judicial independence by political interference in court administration, the rule-making 
process, and judicial decision-making. See John M. Greacen, Court Rules and 
Technology (visited July 15, 1999) <http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ncsc/tis/ctc5/106.htm>. 
Greacen wrote in preparation for the Fifth National Court Technology Conference 
(CTC5) of the National Center for State Courts: 
[T]he determination of California's court reporters to fight by every means at 
their disposal the introduction of electronic recording-which threatened the 
existence of their profession-is instructive. Other states should anticipate 
strong opposition from court reporters to the introduction of electronic and 
videotape recording or the use of voice recognition software not only to record 
testimony but to translate it into written form. Perhaps we should be prepared 
for the possibility that other groups of court employees may organize to oppose 
other technologies that they perceive as threatening to their job security. For 
instance, file clerks might oppose electronic filing technology because there 
would no longer be any paper files for them to manage. Microfilm operators 
might join them. When we develop advanced court security technologies, we 
may anticipate opposition from bailiffs if their jobs are threatened. 
Id; see also Hewitt, supra note 10, at 5 ("From a political perspective, the disadvantages 
[ of video court reporting] are obvious: significant resistance and controversy generally 
ensue where court reporters are well organized and influential, as they are in many states 
and cities."). 
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California is one of the few remaining states where the legislature plays 
the dominant rulemaking role in court administration, practice, and 
procedure." The highly effective court reporter lobby34 has caused the 
defeat of virtually every bill that would have expressly authorized the 
electronic recording of superior court proceedings." California statutes, 
derived from a single progenitor statute enacted in 1861, have-with 
minor exceptions36-failed to keep pace with rapidly evolving 
33. See Greacen, supra note 32. Greacen writes: 
California is one of only a handful of states that takes the federal view that the 
legislature has plenary authority to enact court rules if it wishes to do so. The 
rule-making authority of the California Judicial Council is limited to rules 
consistent with stale statute. Most states take the contrary view-that rule 
making is the exclusive province of the judiciary. 
Id. New York is another state where legislature and courts concurrently exercise rule-
making authority. See Bloom v. Crosson, 590 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (App. Div. 1992) 
("Under our State constitutional scheme, the authority to regulate the courts is split 
between the Legislature and the Chief Judge."). Heavy lobbying by the New York State 
Court Reporters Association ("NYSCRA") in the New York State Legislature has kept 
electronic recording to an "experimental" program that began in 1992. In 1997, the 
Legislature extended the electronic recording experiment two more years, rejecting the 
court administrators' recommendation "to give the court system expanded authority to 
use tape recorders in place of court stenographers in all state-funded trial courts." Daniel 
Wise, Expanded Use of Tape Recorders Is Urged, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at I; see 
Gary Spencer, Legislature Budgets $952.2 Million/or Courts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1997, at 
I. 
34. See Tom Dresslar, The Bill Rejecters: In Sacramento, Court Reporters Swat 
Away Endeavors to Change Their Status, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1993, at 1. Dresslar 
writes: 
Id. 
[T]he CCRA no doubt would rank with the greatest shot blockers in history. 
The record shows that when it comes to legislation detrimental to its members' 
financial and professional interests, the association can kill with the best of 
them. 
Assembly Judiciary Committee Chairman Phil Isenberg puts a slightly 
different spin on the historical record. 
"The Legislature has kowtowed to court reporters in a shameless 
fashion," said the Sacramento Democrat who has lost several duels to what he 
calls the "court reporter monopoly." 
35. The following are two exceptions: (I) the statutory authorization of electronic 
recording in municipal court, see infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text, and (2) the 
electronic recording authorized in selected superior courts under a demonstration project, 
which expired in January 1994. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text. 
36. Court reporting statutes have been updated to reflect technological advances in 
shorthand. For example, "[t]ranscription by typewriter or other printing machine was 
authorized in 1903." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 269 historical note (West 1982) (current 
version at CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 269 (West Supp. 1999)). The Legislature added 
subsection ( c) to section 269 of the California Code of Civil Procedure in order to reflect 
advances in computer-aided transcription technology. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 269 
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developments in electronic recording technology because the court 
reporting profession has used its considerable leverage in the Legislature 
to protect its vested interest in shorthand. 
Until the use of electronic recording technology to prepare the court 
record became a fact of life in American courtrooms during the last two 
decades, shorthand was the only available means to make a verbatim 
record. The history of modem courtroom recording goes back to the 
mid-nineteenth century, when a small cadre of stenographers were able 
to adapt shorthand to the verbatim reporting of court proceedings." 
Beginning in the 1860s, legislatures enacted statutes that authorized 
courts to appoint official court reporters to take advantage of this 
cutting-edge phenomenon." When these first court reporting statutes 
were enacted, the court reporting profession was in its infancy and 
qualified court stenographers were scarce-especially in frontier 
California." California's first court reporting statute was enacted in 
186140 following the enactment of a similar statute in New York State in 
1860.41 While no legislative history survives, it is reasonable to infer 
that the problem addressed by the original 1861 California court 
reporting statute was the lack of assured, quality access by judges and 
litigants to the only available technology to make a verbatim record-
shorthand court reporting. In California, this nineteenth century statute 
remains on the books remarkably intact despite the emergence of 
twenty-first century non-stenographic court reporting alternatives. 
Having prevailed in the legislature, the California Court Reporters 
Association later scored two big victories in the judicial arena. First, it 
persuaded the First District Court of Appeal to strike down the Judicial 
Council's Electronic Recording Rules. Accordingly, the court's 1995 
decision in California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council of 
California ( CCRA It' held that these rules of court were "inconsistent 
(West Supp. 1999). 
37. See generally Oswald M.T. Ratteray, Verbatim Reporting Comes of Age, 56 
JUDICATURE 368 (1973) (discussing the origins of official court reporting in the 1860s). 
38. See JULIUS ENSIGN ROCKWELL, THE TEACHING, PRACTICE, AND LITERATURE OF 
SHORTHAND 46-47 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office 1884). 
39. See Ratteray, supra note 37, at 368 ("Many transcripts of this [early to mid-
19th century] period ... show evidence of considerable condensation and gaps in the 
reporter's notes that were subsequently filled in. In many instances the reporters were 
probably just not skilled enough to record every word.") (footnote omitted). A writer for 
an 1884 Department of the Interior survey on shorthand reporting in the United States 
wrote: "[S]ince the introduction of phonography in 1845, ... the dissemination of the art 
has gone steadily forward, and its use during the last five years has been greatly on the 
increase." ROCKWELL, supra note 38, at 23. 
40. See Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 434, 1861 Cal. Stat. 497. 
41. See ROCKWELL, supra note 38, at 46. 
42. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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with statute" and, therefore, their promulgation exceeded the power of 
the Judicial Council under article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 43 Two years later, the first appellate district issued its 
second opinion in the California Court Reporters litigation, CCRA Il,44 
which upheld a sweeping judgment by Judge Garcia of the Alameda 
County Superior Court issued pursuant to CCRA I." The superior court 
judgment not only declared the Judicial Council's Electronic Recording 
Rules invalid, but it further declared that "the use of nonstenographic 
methods for producing the OFFICIAL verbatim record of superior court 
proceedings are contrary to the intent of the Legislat[ ure] .',46 
Accordingly, the superior court enjoined the Judicial Council and the 
Alameda County Superior Court from "authorizing and from causing the 
expenditure of public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a 
nonstenographic method and system for preparing the official verbatim 
record of superior court proceedings.'"'' 
Pursuant to the injunction, the Judicial Council, in January 1997, 
directed "each superior court not to expend any of the upcoming [fiscal 
year] 96-97 third quarter state funding distribution on the maintenance or 
creation of nonstenographic methods for preparing the official verbatim 
record of superior court proceedings.'''' Two years later, the council 
expansively interpreted the portion of the injunction that restrained the 
council from "authorizing and from causing the expenditure of public 
funds" to maintain electronic recording to include local user fees and 
county funds that are not included in the state funds allocated by the 
Judicial Council to local superior courts." 
43. Id. at 56 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6). 
44. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997). 
45. See id. at 531. 
46. California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council, No. 728173-6 (Alameda 
County Sup. Ct. Nov. I, 1996) Gudgment of Hon. David A. Garcia, Judge of the 
Alameda County Superior Court). 
47. Id. 
48. Memorandum from William C. Vickrey to All Presiding and Sole Judges of 
the Superior Courts et al., supra note 9, at 2. 
49. By letter dated January 14, 1999, the council directed that "superior courts may 
not use any funds allocated by the Judicial Council for electronic recording to make the 
official verbatim record." Letter from William C. Vickrey to Kathleen E. O'Leary, 
supra note 16, at I. The prohibition was to apply "even if the funds are recouped 
through charges to the litigants or payments by a county or other source." Id. 
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B. The Statutes: California's "Permissive" Statutory Structure 
for Making a Verbatim Record Dates Back to the 
Original 1861 Court Reporting Statute 
1. The 1861 Statute 
The original court reporting statute,'0 from which current code sections 
are derived,' 1 was permissive in that it only authorized, but did not 
require, courts to appoint shorthand reporters and did not require that 
courts maintain a verbatim record. This statute gave judges the option to 
hire court reporters and gave judges and litigants the option to request a 
verbatim record and a readily available means for creating that record." 
The 1861 statute sprang from a public-regarding" purpose to create-
not to restrict-technological options for courts and litigants who chose 
to make a verbatim record. The original legislative decision to authorize 
the courts to appoint official court reporters was not a decision to 
exclude other, non-existent, means of making a verbatim record." Nor 
50. See Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 434, 1861 Cal. Stat. 497. 
51. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 269(a), 273 (West Supp. 1999); CAL. Gov'T 
CODE § 69941 (West 1997). For further discussion of these statutes, see infra notes 61-
65 and accompanying text. 
52. The Act states in part: 
SECTION I. The District Judge of each of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Tenth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth, Judicial Districts, is hereby authorized to 
appoint a competent Short Hand Reporter, who shall, at the request of either 
party in a civil case, or in criminal cases, triable in the District Court, at the 
request of the court, take down in short hand, the rulings of the court, the 
exceptions taken, and the testimony, and shall within five days after the trial of 
such case, write out the same in plain, legible, Jong, handwriting, and file it, 
together with the original short handwriting, with the Clerk of the court in 
which the cause was tried. 
SEC. 2. Such report, written out in long handwriting, as aforesaid, shall be 
deemed prima facie a correct statement of the evidence and proceedings 
therein contained. 
Ch. 434, 186 I Cal. Stat. 497, 497-98 (first and second emphasis added). 
53. The term "public-regarding" is attributed to Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional 
Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849,868 (1980). A 
subsequent article explains the concept as follows: "If the statute in question is the result 
of a reified, deliberative congressional process in which conceptions of the public good 
were considered, then the statute is public-regarding. If, however, the statute simply 
represents legislative acquiescence to raw political power, it is not public-regarding." 
Jonathan R. Macy, Prorrwting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 n.29 (1986). 
54. A previous article argues that the CCRA I court, through expansive statutory 
interpretation, transformed what began as public-regarding statutes into rent-seeking 
statutes that grant a monopoly to a powerful special interest group to make the record of 
superior court proceedings. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at I 70-
72, 174. 
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was the decision intended to preempt the Judicial Council-which did 
not exist until 1926-from exercising its own rulemaking power over 
court administration to authorize superior courts to use emerging 
technologies as they evolved." 
The 1861 Legislature apparently rejected a mandatory approach that 
would have required a shorthand reporter to take down stenographic 
notes of every proceeding.56 California emulated New York's original 
court reporter statute, enacted on April 16, 1860, that provided for the 
selective verbatim reporting of court proceedings. However, while New 
York's Legislature abandoned this permissive approach three years later, 
amending its statute to require court regorters to take "full stenographic 
notes of all proceedings in every trial," California did not. California's 
55. The Judicial Council and the Legislature exercise concurrent rulemaking 
authority over practice, procedure, and court administration. The Council's rulemaking 
authority is limited to promulgating rules that are "not inconsistent with statute" and is, 
therefore, secondary to that of the Legislature. CAL. CONST., art. VI, § 6. CCRA I 
broadly interpreted "not inconsistent with statute" to mean, in effect, consistent with an 
unarticulated legislative intent suggested by an implied statutory scheme. See CCRA I, 
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 51 (Ct. App. 1995). The court wrote: 
[W]e conclude that when evaluating whether a rule of court is "not inconsistent 
with statute" ... , a court must determine the Legislature's intent behind the 
statutory scheme that the rule was intended to implement and measure the 
rule's consistency with that intent. ... 
. . . We must determine whether the statutory scheme addresses the 
making of the official record in such a manner as to suggest that the 
Legislature implicitly intended that this record be made by certified shorthand 
reporters rather than by electronic recording. 
Id. CCRA I's broad construction of "not inconsistent with statute" invites courts to 
presume legislative preemption of judicial authority over court administration and, 
thereby, threatens to undermine judicial self-governance that is the key to judicial 
independence in the twenty-first century. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 
20, at 145, 149, 160-62, 164. 
56. The text of a pre-enactment version of the 1861 statute read as follows: 
Section 2: The duties of such Reporter shall be to attend in person the sittings 
of the District Court within his district, and to take down in stenographic or 
phonographic hand during the trial of every cause in such Court the testimony 
of the witnesses and the proceedings had pending the trial of such cause; and 
immediately thereafter, to write out at length in a plain, legible hand a correct 
and complete report of such testimony, and all the proceedings in the cause, 
state the testimony as nearly as possible in the exact words of the witnesses, or 
interpreter as given at the trial, and with like exactings the questions asked the 
witnesses; objections stated; rulings of the Court, and the exceptions taken. 
Such report when prepared shall be filed with the papers in the cause, and shall 
constitute a part of the record thereof. 
Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 434, § 2 (handwritten draft) ( emphasis added) ( on file with 
author). 
57. ROCKWELL supra note 38, at 46 ( emphasis added). 
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current court reporter statutes retain this essential permissive structure 
while New York's court reporter statutes retain their mandatory 
structure." 
2. Current Statutory Law Pertaining to Court Reporting Authorizes, 
but Does Not Require, the Appointment of Official Court 
Reporters and the Preparation of a Verbatim Record 
No statute expressly mandates that an official superior court record be 
made by shorthand reporters nor expressly prohibits using non-
stenographic means to make a verbatim record." Current statutory law 
does not even require the creation of a verbatim court record."' 
Moreover, section 69941 of the California Government Code continues 
to authorize-but not require-superior courts to appoint official 
reporters." Section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
continues to confer upon the parties and the court the option to create-
or not create-a verbatim record.62 In the event a superior court appoints 
58. See N.Y. Jun. LAW§ 295 (McKinney 1983) ("Each stenographer ... must take 
full stenographic notes of the testimony and of all other proceedings in each cause tried 
or heard.") ( emphasis added). The California Legislature knows how to require official 
reporters to prepare verbatim records when it wants to because it has done so in juvenile 
court hearings conducted by a juvenile court judge. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 347 
(West 1998) ("At any juvenile court hearing conducted by a juvenile court judge, an 
official court reporter shall ... take down in shorthand all the testimony and all of the 
statements and remarks of the judge and all persons appearing at the hearing .... ") 
(emphasis added). 
59. The First District Court of Appeal conceded these two propositions in CCRA I, 
citing an earlier decision involving the Los Angeles CCRA for support. See CCRA I, 46 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51 (citing Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 
37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 345 (Ct. App. 1995)). Nevertheless, the court went beyond express 
statutory language to inquire whether "the statutory scheme addresses the making of the 
official record in such a manner as to suggest that the Legislature implicitly intended that 
this record be made by certified shorthand reporters rather than by electronic 
recording." Id. (emphasis added). 
60. In California, settled or agreed statements may be used in lieu of verbatim 
transcripts as part of the appellate record. See CAL. R. CT. 6, 7. 
61. Section 69941 reads: 
The judge or judges of any superior court may appoint a competent 
phonographic reporter, or as many such reporters as there are judges, to be 
known as official reporter or reporters of such court, and such pro tempore 
official reporters as the convenience of the court may require. The reporters 
shall hold office during the pleasure of the appointing judge or judges. 
CAL. GoV'TCODE § 69941 (West 1997) (emphasis added). 
62 
62. Section 269(a) reads: 
The official reporter of a superior court ... shall, at the request of either 
party, or of the court in a civil case other than a limited civil case, and on the 
order of the court, the district attorney, or the attorney for the defendant in a 
felony case, take down in shorthand all testimony, objections made, rulings of 
the court, exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas, and sentences of 
defendants in felony cases, arguments of the prosecuting attorney to the jury, 
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an official reporter, statutes prescribe the duties of that official reporter 
and regulate administrative matters like fees and salary.6' Consistent 
with the text of the 1861 statute, the duty of an official court reporter of 
a superior court to "take down in shorthand all the testimony" arises 
only if his services are requested by either party or the court.64 The basic 
"permissive" -option-creating-statutory structure enacted in 1861 
remains essentially intact in California's contemporary court reporting 
statutes. Also consistent with the 1861 statute, the court reporter's 
certified transcript constitutes "prima facie evidence of [the] testimony 
and proceedings" in the case.6' 
and all statements and remarks made and oral instructions given by the judge. 
If directed by the court, or requested by either party, the official reporter shall, 
within such reasonable time after the trial of the case as the court may 
designate, write the transcripts out, or the specific portions thereof as may be 
requested, in plain and legible longhand, or by typewriter, or other printing 
machine, and certify that the transcripts were correctly reported and 
transcribed, and when directed by the court, file the transcripts with the clerk 
of the court. 
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added). 
63. Originally, in 1861, fees were not fixed by statute but negotiated privately 
between the Reporter and the parties. See Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 434, 1861 Cal. Stat. 
497, 498 ("SEC. 3. Such Reporter shall receive such compensation for his services as 
may be agreed upon between the said Reporter and the parties, or counsel, in the cause, 
and in case of failure to agree, between the said parties, then the amount may be fixed by 
the court."). Fees are now fixed by statute under the following sections of the California 
Code of Government: section 69947 ("Except in counties where a statute provides 
otherwise, the official reporter shall receive for his services the fees prescribed in this 
article."), section 69948 (fee for reporting contested cases), section 69948.5 (rate of 
compensation for court reporters in Modoc County), section 69949 (reporting defaults or 
uncontested matters), section 69950 (transcription: originals and copies), section 69951 
(transcription in civil cases; additional fee), and section 69954 (compensation for 
transcripts prepared with computer assistance). CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 69947, 69948, 
69948.5, 69949, 69950, 69951, 69954 (West 1997). In 1993, section 68086 of the 
California Code of Government was amended to authorize superior courts to charge the 
parties in a civil case, who use a court reporter's services, a user fee equal to the "actual 
cost of providing that service." CAL. Gov'r CODE § 68086 (West Supp. 1999). In 
addition to fees, court reporters are paid salaries that are also fixed by statute. See CAL. 
Gov'rCODE §§ 69994.2-70063 (West 1997). 
64. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999). 
65. CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE § 273 (West Supp. 1999). An earlier draft of the 
section of the 1861 statute from which section 273 is derived had provided that the court 
reporter's "report" of testimony was, "for the purposes of making a statement upon 
motion for new trial or appeal ... conclusive of the facts therein stated." Act of May 17, 
1861, ch. 434, § 4 (handwritten draft) (emphasis added) (on file with author). The word 
"conclusive" presumably would have foreclosed a party on appeal from disputing the 
accuracy of the court reporter's transcript. The statutory presumption of accuracy 
created by section 273 can be rebutted by an electronic recording of the same 
proceedings. See infra note 250. 
63 
The only express statutory authorization for the electronic recording of 
court proceedings is limited to municipal courts-but only where an 
official reporter is "unavailable."66 However, in the fifty-four out of 
fifty-eight counties that have voted to unify their trial courts under 
Proposition 220, municipal courts no longer exist.67 For this reason, 
section 72194.5 of the California Government Code was amended in 
1998 to permit "a court" to order electronic recording of "court" 
proceedings in a "limited civil case, or a misdemeanor or infraction 
case" where an official reporter is unavailable."' 
Section 72194.5 of the California Government Code is an exception to 
section 274c of the California Code of Civil Procedure.6' Section 274c, 
the municipal court "analogue" to section 269(a) of the California Code 
of Civil Procedure, requires a court reporter to record municipal court 
proceedings upon the request of a party or the court.'0 The Legislature 
enacted section 72194.5 to address a critical shortage of court reporters 
in municipal court." The Judicial Council, as section 72194.5's sponsor, 
66. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 72194.5 (West 1997) (prior to 1998 amendment) 
("Whenever an official court reporter ... is unavailable to report an action or proceeding 
in a municipal ... court ... , the municipal ... court may order that the action ... be 
electronically recorded .... "). 
67. See News Release, supra note 8. 
68. Act of Sept. 28, 1998, ch. 931, sec. 324, § 72194.5, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. 
5101, 5213 (West) (S.B. 2139); see CAL. LAW REvISION COMM'N, 28 REPoRTS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES 383 (I 998) ("Section 72194.5 is amended to 
accommodate unification of the municipal and superior courts in a county."); see also 
CAL. Gov'TCODE § 72194.5 historical and statutory notes (West Supp. 1999). The 1998 
Amendment provides: 
Nothing in this act is intended to change the extent to which court reporter 
services or electronic reporting may be used in the courts. It is the intent of 
this act to provide for court reporter services and electronic reporting in a 
county in which there is no municipal court to the same extent as otherwise 
provided by law in a county in which there is a municipal court. 
Ch. 931, sec. 507, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 5308. 
69. Section 274c says: "Official reporters shall, at the request of either party or of 
the court in a limited civil case, ... take down in shorthand all the testimony .... " CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE§ 274c (West Supp. 1999). 
70. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 341, 374 (Ct. App. 1995). The court wrote: 
It appears to us that Government Code section 72194.5 . . . merely 
authorizes ... an exception to the command in section 274c, the municipal and 
justice court analogue to section 269, that an official reporter record those civil 
proceedings in municipal or justice courts for which the judge or a party 
requests the presence of an official reporter. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
71. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 48-49 (1989). The 
report states: 
64 
Under the direction of the Judicial Council, the Administrative Office of 
the Courts (AOC) in 1974 conducted a study of court reporting in California 
municipal courts to determine whether electronic recording could be used in 
courts without certified shorthand reporters. 
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made no attempt to extend authorization of electronic recording to 
superior court." The court reporters did not actively oppose this bill 
"because-with the exception of felony preliminary hearings-business 
is sparse in municipal court .... [B]ecause few parties appeal municipal 
court decisions, most parties do not order transcripts in municipal court 
proceedings."73 
3. Repeated Attempts to Update Court Reporting Statutes 
Blocked by Powerful Court Reporter Lobby 
When the electronic recording of court proceedings became feasible in 
the early 1970s," California courts were uncertain whether the use of 
At the time of the study, municipal courts did not uniformly maintain 
records of all proceedings. Some courts provided a stenographic reporter for 
all proceedings, others employed reporters only for felony preliminaries, and a 
range of other practices existed between these two extremes. 
In the absence of stenographic reporters, the majority of municipal courts 
relied on the handwritten minutes of courtroom clerks to make court records. 
The AOC study indicated that electronic recording could be used to make court 
records or to supplement existing court record-making systems. 
The study led to . . . . Government Code section 72194.5, which 
authorizes electronic recording in municipal and justice courts under certain 
circumstances .... 
Id.; see also Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 112-13. 
72. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 112-13. 
73. Id. at 113 (footnote omitted). The First District Court of Appeal has held that, 
where a misdemeanor defendant does appeal his conviction in municipal court, an 
electronic recording of municipal court proceedings satisfies the defendant's 
constitutional right to a "verbatim 'record of sufficient completeness' permitting proper 
consideration of an appeal." In re Armstrong, 178 Cal. Rptr. 902,908 (Ct. App. 1981). 
The Armstrong court rejected appellant's argument that electronic recording would not 
provide him with an adequate verbatim record, stating: "If the claimed inadequacies of 
electronic recording shall hereafter be established by judicial experience, or otherwise, 
the constitutional requirement will not have been met." Id. Recently, the Second 
District Court of Appeal rejected appellant's reliance on Armstrong to support his 
contention that "electronic recording has now been found by judicial experience 
construing statutory requirements to be inadequate in felony trials conducted in Superior 
Court when an objection has been made." People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 745 
(Ct. App. 1998). The Turner court explained, "Armstrong does not purport to decide 
whether electronic recording is inferior to certified shorthand reporting." Id. 
74. See J. MICHAEL GREENWOOD ET AL., A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF 
STENOORAPHIC AND AUDIOTAPE METHODS FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
REPORTING 13 (1983) (describing a study in the Sacramento courts in 1973). The 
California Legislature authorized the use of electronic recording in municipal courts in 
1975. See supra note 71. Courts began to experiment with non-stenographic verbatim 
recording technology in the early 1950s, beginning with sound recording followed by 
audio-video recording in the I 980s. See, e.g., WARREN OLNEY III, REPORT ON 
65 
this technology required express statutory authorization." Existing court 
reporting statutes that originated in the 1860s, when shorthand was the 
only verbatim recording technology, naturally referred only to shorthand 
court reporters." Before 1975, no statute expressly authorized electronic 
recording in any California state court." Since shorthand court reporting 
is expressly authorized by statute, it might seem, upon superficial 
analysis, that electronic recording also requires express statutory 
authorization and that, without it, courts are powerless to electronically 
record their proceedings. 
Understandably reluctant to use its own rulemaking authority over 
court administration, and, desiring the electronic recording option, the 
Judicial Council chose the politically safer course of seeking express 
statutory authority from the Legislature." From 1971 to the present, 
ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING IN THE TRIAL COURTS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 2 (1961) 
("Even prior to . . . 1958, there had been some studies and experiments with electronic 
recording of court proceedings carried on at the instigation of the Judicial 
Conference .... "). 
75. Such authorization is not required, and California's tradition of detailed 
legislative regulation of court administration and procedure is baggage from the Field 
Code days when court procedure was micro-managed by state legislatures. See Koppel, 
Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 149-51; see also supra notes 59-65 and 
accompanying text. California's legislative dominance of court administration and 
procedure is out-of-step with national trends and is at odds with the reformist spirit of 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution that expressly confers upon the 
Judicial Council rulemaking power over "court administration." CAL. CONST., art. VI, § 
6; see Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary 
Judgment and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 l'EPP. L. Rev. 455, 461 (1997) 
("California is one of the few remaining American jurisdictions where the legislature 
continues to write the rules of court procedure."); Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra 
note 20, at 128-31, 149-55. 
76. These statutes have been updated occasionally to reflect technological 
advancements in shorthand. For example, in 1903, section 269 of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure was amended to permit official reporters to write out their shorthand 
notes "by typewriter, or other printing machine" in addition to "plain and legible 
longhand." Act of Mar. 19, 1903, ch. 200, sec. I, § 269, 1903 Cal. Stat. 234, 234. This 
same section was again amended in 1993 to authorize delivery of a transcript "in a 
computer-readable form." Act of Oct. 9, 1993, ch. 1016, sec. I,§ 269(c), 1993 Cal. Stat. 
5737, 5738 (A.B. 1929). 
77. In 1975, section 72194.5 of the California Code of Government was enacted, 
permitting municipal courts to electronically record proceedings when an official 
reporter is unavailable. See CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 72194.5 historical and statutory notes 
(West Supp. 1999). 
78. The reasons for this prudent approach are twofold. Politically, the Council had 
good reason to defer to the Legislature as a matter of comity. Although the courts and 
the Legislature exercise concurrent authority over court administration in California, the 
Legislature still plays the dominant role of senior partner in court administration and 
rulemaking. See supra note 33. And, like all legislatures, the California Legislature 
holds the power of the purse with the concomitant ability to cut court funding in 
retaliation against the judiciary for perceived slights. See, e.g., Bill Ainsworth, Battle of 
the Branches-The Supreme Court vs. the Legislature, CAL. J., Jan. I, 1993, at 21-23. 
The LEXIS version of this article offered as the article's "highlight" the words, "The 
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numerous bills have been introduced in the Legislature that would have 
expressly authorized electronic recording of proceedings in superior 
courts and administrative hearings throughout the state." The court 
Supreme Court upheld legislative term limits, so the Legislature slashed the Court's 
budget." Id., available in LEXIS. California's judiciary is acutely cognizant of the 
populist political culture of this state, inherited from its frontier past, in which courts 
must not appear to usurp the democratic prerogatives of the Legislature by making 
politically sensitive decisions that may offend powerful interest groups like the court 
reporters. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 149-51. Legally, the 
limits of the Judicial Council's rulemaking power are ill-defined. Under article VI, 
section 6 of the state constitution, the Council's rules of court may not be "inconsistent 
with statute." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. This, of course, is an ambiguous phrase. Given 
the ambiguity of the constitutional limits on the court's rulemaking authority and of out-
of-date court reporting statutes, the Council may have preferred to avoid, if possible, the 
risk of unnecessarily promulgating rules that could be struck down by the courts-a risk 
that became reality in the CCRA decisions. 
79. See generally Dresslar, supra note 34, at I. Dresslar wrote: 
Occasionally, bills establishing or modifying electronic recording pilot projects 
have slipped through the Legislature and become law. But the more far-
reaching proposals---even those that protected the jobs of current reporters-
have gone down to ignominious defeat. 
Some examples: 
• AB626, carried by then-Assemblyman William Filante in the 1981-
82 session, would have allowed electronic recording upon the 
stipulation of both parties. It died at its first committee hearing. 
• AB586, carried by Assemblyman Robert Frazee in the 1983-84 
session, would have allowed electronic recording in judicial 
proceedings. It didn't even get a hearing. 
• AB1523, carried by then-Assemblyman, now-Sen. Tim Leslie in the 
1987-88 session, would have established a pilot project for use of 
video recording of judicial proceedings. It never reached the 
Assembly floor. 
• AB3112, carried by Assemblyman Curt Pringle in the 1989-90 
session, would have allowed [administrative hearings conducted by 
the Office of Administrative Hearings to be reported electronically at 
the option of the administrative law judge without the parties' prior 
consent]. Pringle dropped it without even taking it to a hearing. 
• AB2937, carried by Isenberg in the 1991-92 session, would have 
allowed electronic recording of judicial proceedings. Isenberg was 
the only "yes" vote in his own committee. Not only did Isenberg get 
hammered, but the Judicial Council got embarrassed. It supported 
the measure, but reporters persuaded individual judges to write 
letters to committee members opposing it. 
• SB211, introduced by Sen. Milton Marks [in 1993], would allow 
Marin County courts to use electronic recording in all judicial 
proceedings except death penalty cases. It is languishing in the 
Senate Rules Committee, where it probably will die without a policy 
committee hearing. 
• Sometimes the association kills ideas even before they get into bills. 
Another proposal by Isenberg--{;arried [in 1993] on behalf of the 
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reporter lobby blocked each of these bills.'° The Council's repeated 
defeat in the Legislature laid the groundwork for its defeat in the First 
Sacramento Superior and Municipal Courts-provides a prime 
example. 
Id. at I. This Article's research adds to the defeated list as follows: 
• A.B. 506, 1971 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1971) (introduced by Assemblymen 
Warren (Chair-Assembly Committee on the Judiciary), Moretti, Cullen, 
and Thomas on Feb 15, 1971, would have authorized the electronic 
recording of proceedings in all courts in lieu of a court reporter; died in 
committee on Jan. 3, 1972). 
• A.B. 3395, 1973-1974 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1974) (introduced by 
Assemblyman Lanterman on Mar. 14, 1974, would have authorized the 
electronic recording of proceedings in all courts in lieu of a court reporter; 
died in committee on Nov. 30, 1974). 
• S.B. 851, 1978-1979 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1979) (introduced by 
Assemblyman Philip Wyman on Mar. 12, 1979, would have permitted 
state agencies to reduce costs by permitting them to record administrative 
hearings through multi-track audio recording devices in lieu of shorthand 
reporters). 
• S.B. 703, 1978-1979 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1979) (introduced by Senator 
Sieroty on Mar. 22, 1979, would have replaced section 72194.5 of the 
California Government Code with a blanket authorization to municipal 
and superior courts to use electronic recording irrespective of the 
availability of an official reporter and would have authorized electronic 
recording of administrative hearings). 
• S.B. 1050, 1978-1979 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1979) (introduced by Senator 
Holmdahl on April 2. 1979, would have amended section 269 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure to require official reporters in superior 
courts to take down testimony "in shorthand, or by electronic recording 
device at the judge's discretion"). 
• A.B. 2034, 1982-1983 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1983) (introduced by 
Assemblyman Bradley on Mar. 7, 1983, would have authorized electronic 
recording of administrative hearings upon consent of all the parties). 
• A.B. 2113, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (introduced by 
Assembly Member Miller on Jan. 30, 1996, would have expressly 
authorized the Judicial Council to promulgate rules of court providing 
unqualified authorization to superior courts to produce a verbatim record 
of proceedings). 
• A.B. 128, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (introduced by 
Assembly Member Bill Morrow on April 20, 1998, would have expressly 
authorized the Judicial Council to promulgate rules of court providing 
unqualified authorization to any court to produce a verbatim record of 
proceedings; bill died in committee on April 20, 1998). 
• A.B. 1023, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (introduced by 
Assembly Member Margett on Feb. 25, 1999 to expressly authorize the 
Judicial Council to promulgate rules of court providing unqualified 
authorization to any court to produce a verbatim record of proceedings; 
last committee action: "Hearing canceled at the request of author" on 
April 20, 1999). 
• A.B. 1354, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (introduced by 
Assembly Member Lampert on Feb. 26, 1999 to "state the intent of the 
Legislature to enact provisions permitting the use of electronic recording 
of court proceedings in participating counties"). 
80. See Greacen, supra note 32; Jacobs, supra note 12, at BI; Dresslar, supra note 
34, at I; Walters, supra note 21, at 6. 
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District Court of Appeal in the CCRA I decision. Although the CCRA 
court disclaimed any formal reliance on the failure of the Legislature to 
enact express authorization for electronic recording, the court interpreted 
the Judicial Council's strategic choice to seek express legislative 
authorization as an implied admission by the Council that it lacked 
rulemaking authority to expressly authorize electronic recording.'1 
In 1986, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 825--codified as 
section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure-that required the 
Judicial Council to "establish a demonstration project to assess the costs, 
benefits, and acceptability of utilizing audio and video recording as a 
means of producing a verbatim record of proceedings" in a limited 
number of superior court departments." Assembly Bill 825 contained a 
built-in "sunset" provision. The project self-destructed on January 1, 
199483 and was not renewed in spite of the following recommendation 
of the legislatively-appointed Electronic Recording Advisory 
Committee: "In civil litigation, it should be the litigant's decision which 
method (ER or CSR) will be used to make the record."84 
Assembly Bill 825 was the product of a political compromise between 
the Judicial Council and the CCRA.85 As originally introduced, 
Assembly Bill 825 would have provided blanket and temporally 
8 I. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
82. Act of July 16, 1986, ch. 373, sec. 1, § 270(a), 1986 Cal. Stat. 1552, 1552 
(A.B. 825). 
83. See id. (terminating on Jan. I, 1992); Act of Sept. 22, 1989, ch. 678, sec. I, 2, 
§§ 270(a), 72194.5, 1989 Cal. Stat. 2134, 2135, 2136 (A.B. 1854) (extending the life of 
the demonstration project another two years and expanding the number of superior court 
departments authorized to participate in the project). 
84. ELECTRONIC RECORDING PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 25, at 7. 
The court reporters insisted upon the formation of the legislative advisory committee as 
part of the price for lifting their opposition to the demonstration project bill, Assembly 
Bill 825. See SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 25, at 5. According to the 
Senate Committee on Judiciary, "[The court reporters] questioned the objectivity of the 
Judicial Council in reviewing the use of electronic recording, as the Council sponsored 
the bill in the first place. This dual review ... is a compromise meant to ensure that all 
parties involved have input into the Legislature's evaluation." Id. 
85. See SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 25, at 5. This report states: 
Last year this measure arrived before this Committee in a significantly 
different form, establishing a pilot project in Los Angeles County and 
providing a blanket authorization for electronic recording devices in rural 
counties. Proponents and opponents agreed to undertake negotiations in order 
to determine if a compromise could be found. After months of work, they 
successfully developed the current language and are now in delicate 
agreement. 
Id. at 4. 
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unlimited authorization to electronically record proceedings in all 
superior courts. Through intense opposition and lobbying, the CCRA 
succeeded in limiting the scope and duration of electronic recording in 
superior court and, ultimately, killed it.'• 
As a result of the demonstration project, "about 15% of superior 
courtrooms [were] equipped for video and audio recording" as of May 
15, 1996." In 1987, "demonstration" courtrooms in Los Angeles Coun7. 
Superior Court were equipped with sound recording technology.' 
Between 1990 and 1992, demonstration courtrooms in ten additional 
counties were established." Of these ten additional counties, five 
implemented audio recording90 and five-including Orange County-
installed video recording technology.'1 
The doomed fate of electronic recording in superior court under the 
demonstration project was a foregone conclusion. Anticipating the 
January 1, 1994 "sunset" of the demonstration project, the Judicial 
Council sponsored Assembly Bill 2937, introduced on February 19, 
1992 by Assembly Judiciary Committee Chair Phil Isenberg." This bill 
would have given any court, including superior courts, the discretion to 
"utilize audio or video recording as the means of making a verbatim 
record of any hearing or proceedings."" Notwithstanding California's 
seventeen-year experience with electronic recording in municipal 
courts94 and six-year experience in selected superior courts under the 
demonstration project," as well as a favorable evaluation of the 
demonstration project in the Judicial Council's report to the 
Legislature,'• the bill died in committee on its first hearing. The 
86. For an expanded account of the politics behind the demonstration project, see 
Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 113-17. 
87. Birdlebough, supra note 11, at 2. 
88. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., REP. TO THE CAL. LEGIS. ON ELECTRONIC 
RECORDING DEMONSTRATION PROJECT I, 2, 6 ( 1992). Subsequently, Los Angeles 
County Superior Court installed video recording in 3 departments in addition to the 32 
other departments that were wired for sound. See id. 
89. See id. at 6. Counties set up for demonstration courtrooms were Alameda, 
Contra Costa, Orange, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Mateo, 
Santa Cruz, and Solano Counties. See id. 
90. See id. Counties then implementing audio recording were Alameda, 
Sacramento, San Diego, Santa Cruz, and Solano Counties. See id. 
91. See id. at 4-6. 
92. A.B. 2937, 1991-1992 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992). 
93. Id. 
94. Section 72194.5 of the California Government Code was enacted in 1975. 
Seventeen years later, Assembly Bill 2937 was introduced. 
95. The first demonstration project began in Los Angeles in 1986. See supra note 
87. Six years later, Assembly Bill 2937 was introduced. 
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96. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 88, at 36-37. This report states: 
The use of electronic recording as an alternative method to produce and 
preserve the verbatim court record has been successfully demonstrated in the 
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committee chair, Phil Isenberg, cast the only "aye" vote." 
Since the defeat of the Isenberg bill, five other electronic recording 
bills have been introduced into the Legislature. Senate Bill 211 died in 
committee." Assembly Bill 2113 was defeated on the Assembly floor 
by forty-one percent of the total Assembly's membership." Assembly 
Bill 128 also died in committee.")() Assembly Bills 1023 and 1354, 
introduced in early 1999, both dropped off the legislative radar screen at 
the time of this Article's publication.101 But, despite the apparent clout 
of the CCRA, the Legislature has stopped short of slamming the door 
shut on electronic recording. Indeed, the Legislature has never enacted a 
statute that expressly requires the use of shorthand to make a verbatim 
record, nor has it enacted a statute that expressly precludes the use of 
electronic recording technology to make a verbatim record. 
current pilot project. ... 
Electronic recording has been accepted by the bar and judges as they have 
been exposed to it and become more comfortable with it. ... This project 
confirms what has been found by the many state and federal courts who have 
used electronic recording for years. The issue is one of making a verbatim 
record, and electronic recording has proved to be as acceptable in making a 
record as that made by a stenographic reporter. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
97. See Dresslar, supra note 34, at I. 
98. See Complete Bill History, S.B. 211, 1993-1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993), 
available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 27, 2000) 
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_21 l_bill_history. 
html>. 
99. See Vote Information, A.B. 2113, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), 
available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000) <http: 
//www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/ab_2101-2150/ab_2113_vote_960523_0134PM_as 
m_floor.html>. 
100. An inquiry regarding this bill shows that the last historical action occurred on 
April 20, I 998, when the bill was re-referred to the Committee on Public Safety. See 
Current Bill Status, A.B. 128, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), available at 
California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000) 
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97 -98/bill/asm/ab _O IO 1-0150/ab _I 28_bill_status.html>. 
IOI. An inquiry regarding the current bill status of Assembly Bill 1023 reveals that 
a hearing on the bill was canceled at the request of its author in April of 1999. See 
Current Bill Status, A.B. 1023, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), available at 
California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000) 
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_lOOl-1050/ab_l023_bill_19990421_status. 
html>. Likewise, there has been no action on Assembly Bill 1354 since March I, 1999. 
See Complete Bill History, A.B. 1354, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), available 
at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000) 
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab _1351-1400/ab _ l 354 _bill_ 1999030 I _his tor 
y. html>. 
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C. The Cases 
1. The View from the Fifth Appellate District: The 
LACRAA Decision (January 1995) 
During the final years of the demonstration project, the superior courts 
of Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Orange Counties expanded electronic 
recording into non-demonstration courtrooms-Le., into a number of 
superior court departments that exceeded the number prescribed by 
section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.102 In non-
demonstration courtrooms equipped with electronic recording devices, 
the practice of the Los Angeles Superior Court was to provide litigants 
with an official reporter "on request."103 If neither party requested an 
official reporter, the court could electronically record the proceedings-
and could do so without obtaining any explicit agreement of the 
parties. 104 Official reporters were unavailable in demonstration 
courtrooms, as authorized by statute. 10' Alleging that "the use of 
electronic recording in lieu of official court reporters violated numerous 
statutory provisions,"106 the Los Angeles County Court Reporters 
Association (the LACRAA) brought suit (the LACRAA suit) against the 
Los Angeles Superior Court on February 2, 1993.10' LACRAA sought to 
enjoin the use of electronic recording to make a record of proceedings in 
non-demonstration courtrooms-even where the parties did not request 
an official reporter under section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure. 108 
To avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, the LACRAA suit was 
transferred to Kem County. 109 Ultimately, superior court Judge Anspach 
agreed with the court reporters that section 269 "does not provide for the 
102. See Jean Guccione, Suing for Security: Reporters Take to the Courts to 
Prevent Spread of Electronic Recording, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1993, at 5; Nancy 
Morse, The Reporter Never Rests: Videotaping Program Expands; Not Everyone Happy, 
L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 18, 1993, at I. 
103. Lauren Blau, Court Reporters Win a Round in Taping Conflict, L.A. DAILY J., 
Sept. 3, 1993, at I. 
104. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 341, 343-44 (Ct. App. 1995). 
105. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 270(b) (West Supp. 1999) ("In courtrooms 
operating under the [now-expired] demonstration project, audio or video recording may 
be used in lieu of the verbatim record prepared by a court reporter .... "); see also Blau, 
supra note 103, at I ("But court reporters are provided on request in courtrooms staffed 
with electronic recording equipment, except for the 35 in the pilot project."). 
106. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343. 
107. See id. at 342. 
108. See id. at 343. 
109. See id. 
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use of electronic recording in lieu of a court reporter" 110 and that, 
"[a]bsent legislative authority, only an official reporter can transcribe 
Superior Court proceedings."111 However, Judge Anspach also ruled that 
the statutes do not preclude the parties from expressly waiving "the 
required use of a court reporter"112 by "stipulat[ing] to the use of 
electronic recording."113 Adopting a compromise position that pleased 
neither the LACRAA nor the Los Angeles Superior Court, the court 
ordered the Los Angeles Superior Court to 
cease and desist from using electronic recording as a means of recordation of 
judicial proceedings in the Superior Courts of Los Angeles County for 
proceedings in excess of the number of judicial departments for Los Angeles 
County authorized to use electronic recording ... except where the parties and 
the court do not request a court reporter and the parties agree with the 
approval of the court to the use of electronic reporting. 114 
Both parties appealed. 11 ' The LACRAA pressed for an absolute ban 
on electronic recording in superior court under any circumstances, even 
if the parties expressly stipulate to the use of electronic recording in a 
given proceeding. 116 The Los Angeles Superior Court argued for 
eliminating Judge Anspach's requirement of an express stipulation by 
h · 117 t e parties. 
During the pendency of the IACRAA appeal, the sun had already set 
on the demonstration project (on January 1, 1994).118 The Isenberg bill 
had been defeated almost two years earlier (on April 1, 1992) in 
committee. 119 On November 30, 1993, one month before the expiration 
of the demonstration project, and while the IACRAA appeal was 
pendinf, the Judicial Council promulgated the Electronic Recording 
Rules12 -which the First Appellate District subsequently held to be 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. (emphasis added). 
113. Id. 
I 14. Id. ( emphasis added). 
I I 5. See id. ("The court has appealed and the association has cross-appealed."). 
116. See id. at 344. 
117. See id. 
118. See supra note 83. 
119. See Complete Bill History, A.B. 2937, 1991-1992 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992), 
available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 27, 2000) 
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab _2901-2950/ab _2937 _bill_history. 
html>; see also supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
120. See ELECTRONIC RECORDING RULES, supra note 3. 
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invalid in CCRA I. 121 The Electronic Recording Rules, effective January 
1, 1994, authorized all superior courts to use electronic recording to 
make the verbatim record under either of two circumstances: (1) when 
an official reporter is "unavailable,"122 or (2) when the r,arties proceed in 
the absence of an official reporter "without objection." " The Council's 
rules would have permitted a superior court to electronically record 
proceedings over the objection of a party who requested a court reporter 
if the court found that an official reporter was unavailable. 124 The 
Electronic Recording Rules, therefore, gave the superior courts greater 
discretion to use electronic recording than that discretion afforded under 
the Los Angeles Superior Court system (challenged in the LACRAA 
suit), which required the court to provide an official reporter to any 
party who requested one. 
The California Court Reporters Association promptly brought suit 
against the Judicial Council in December, 1993, seeking to invalidate the 
Electronic Recording Rules as "inconsistent with statute"m and, 
therefore, an unconstitutional exercise of the Judicial Council's 
rulemaking authority. 126 The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided the 
LACRAA appeal in January of 1995, nine months before CCRA I 
invalidated the Judicial Council's Electronic Recording Rules. 
Reversing Judge Anspach, the court sustained the electronic recording 
121. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 46 (Ct. App. 1995). 
122. CAL. R. CT. 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997) (emphasis added). Rule 980.3 
defined ''unavailable" as follows: 
An official reporter or official reporter pro tempore is unavailable within the 
meaning of this rule, among other circumstances: (I) when the person 
regularly employed or under contract as such fails to appear because of illness 
or injury, the need to transcribe notes of cases on appeal, or other cause beyond 
the court's control; or (2) when the court determines that the funds available 
for reporting services are insufficient to employ a qualified person for the 
position at the prevailing wage or at the normal per diem rate of compensation; 
or (3) when the court detennines that a reporter will be unavailable based on 
the court's existing staff of official court reporters, reasonable projections 
concerning official reporters' vacations, sick leaves, and other approved 
absences, and reasonable projections as to the workload in each of the court's 
departments. 
CAL. R. CT. 980.3(b) (1996) (repealed 1997), quoted in CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48 
n.12. 
123. CAL. R. CT. 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997), quoted in CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 48 n.12. 
124. See id. 
125. The phrase "inconsistent with statute" comes from article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
126. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 46-47. The California Court Reporters 
Association joined as additional defendants Patrick O'Connell, Alameda County 
Auditor-Controller, and Ron Overholt, Executive Officer/Clerk of the Alameda County 
Superior Court, but failed to join the court administrators of the other county superior 
courts around the state. See id. at 46 n.2. 
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practice of the Los Angeles Superior Court, stating: 
We therefore anive at a very narrow holding: the court is not prohibited, by 
any explicit or implicit legislative command contained in those specific statutes 
cited by the association, from choosing to maintain a record of general civil 
proceedings by means of electronic recording devices where neither the court 
nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken by an official shorthand 
reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269. 127 
The LACRAA court expressly declined to decide "the purposes, if any, 
for which the generated electronic recording may be used, because this 
question is outside the scope of the discrete issue presented by the 
association's petition and evidence."12' The court was apparently 
referring to the admissibility of a tape recording of proceedings, or a 
transcript derived therefrom, as evidence in the apgellate record offered 
"to prove what took place during the proceeding."' The LACRAA court 
127. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
341, 349-50 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). In this case, the court addressed the 
significance of several statutes. The court wrote, ''The effect of section 270 was simply 
to override section 269 insofar as the demonstration courtrooms were concerned." Id. at 
345. The court stated "[s]ection 273 does nothing more than create an evidentiary 
presumption [of accuracy for an official reporter's transcript]." Id. at 346. The court 
referred to section 274c as "the municipal and justice court analogue to section 269." Id. 
at 347. The court also said: "It appears to us that Government Code section 72194.5 is in 
the same class as former section 270, and merely authorizes ... an exception to the 
command in section 274c .... " Id. Finally, referring to sections 68086(a), 68086(b), 
69941, 69942, 69952, and 69953 of the California Code of Government and to various 
sections of the California Code of Business and Professions beginning with section 8015, 
the court stated: 
None of the other statutes cited by the association are of consequence .... 
These statutes are perfectly compatible with section 269. They all either relate 
to the office of official reporter for purposes of section 269 or apply when a 
request is made in a civil case for the services of an official reporter within the 
scope of section 269. If no such request is made, these statutes, like section 
269, are inapplicable. 
Id. at 347-48. 
128. Id. at 350. 
129. Id. at 344. The court wrote: 
The decision by the parties not to insist upon the presence of an official 
reporter may have certain consequences if it later becomes necessary to prove 
what took place during the proceeding, such as when the unsuccessful party 
wishes to appeal or move for a new trial, but these are concerns which the 
parties should consider when deciding whether to take advantage of section 
269. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). In an unpublished 1998 opinion, the fourth appellate district, 
division three, whose jurisdiction includes Orange County, rejected an appellant's 
"paradoxical" argument that electronic recordings cannot be used in "the creation of 
official reporter's transcripts for the purposes of appeal." Gandall v. Grimes, No. 
6017121, slip op. at 3 (Cal. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 1998). In Grimes, a certified transcript 
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also expressly declined to rule on the validity of the Judicial Council's 
Electronic Recording Rules. "0 
2. The View from the First Appellate District: CCRA I 
(October 1995) and CCRA II (December 1997) 
a. CCRAI 
On October 17, 1995, nine months after the LACRAA decision, the 
First District Court of Appeal delivered its opinion in CCRA /.rn The 
CCRA court interpreted substantially the same statutes that were 
reviewed by the LACRAA court'32-the same statutes found by the 
LACRAA court not to prohibit, expressly or implicitly, the electronic 
recording practice of the Los Angeles superior court."' The CCRA 1 
court, however, interpreting these statutes broadly, determined that the 
Judicial Council's Electronic Recording Rules were "inconsistent with 
statute." 134 
The fact that the Legislature has by statute authorized electronic recording 
in some contexts suggests strongly that-unless the existing statutory scheme 
providing for the official record to be taken down in shorthand is amended-the 
Legislature does not intend that electronic recording of superior court 
proceedings be the method of creating an official record. Although the statutes 
do not expressly prohibit electronic recording of superior court proceedings, 
was prepared from tape by "a duly designated court transcriber." Id. at 5 ( emphasis 
added); see infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text. 
130. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350. After 
the filing of the parties' reply briefs, the CCRA filed an amicus curiae brief that made 
the following arguments not raised by the Los Angeles County Court Reporters 
Association: 
(I) [R Jule 980.3 is invalid because it is "inconsistent with the comprehensive 
statutory scheme that provides for the making of the superior court record;" (2) 
the court improperly expended public funds to install, maintain and operate the 
electronic recording devices in the various courtrooms ... (4) the court 
improperly made it a practice to offer to sell copies of the electronic tapes to 
the parties involved in the civil proceedings for use in connection with motions 
for new trial and appeal. 
Id. Noting the "limited case made by the [Los Angeles Court Reporters A]ssociation," 
the court declined the CCRA's "invitation" to the court "to address all these arguments 
in the interests of efficiency and finality, in order to resolve the entire controversy 
between the parties." Id. 
13 I. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995). 
132. See id. at 51-55. These statutes were sections 269(a), 270, 273, and 274c of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure and sections 68086(a) and (b), 69941, 69948, 
69952(b ). 70044.5-70064, and 72194.5 of the California Code of Government. See id. 
133. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343-51. 
For example, the court wrote, "We fail to see in section 273 an expression, explicit or 
implicit, of a legislative intent to forbid all means of making a verbatim record of civil 
proceedings in superior courts except by the use of official shorthand reporters." Id. at 
346. 
134. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56. 
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they nevertheless lead to one conclusion-that the Legislature intended that 
such proceedings be stenographically recorded by official shorthand 
reporters. 135 
In CCRA I, the court's statutory analysis began with section 269(a) of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure,136 which requires the official 
reporter to prepare a verbatim record "at the request of either party, or of 
the court,"137 rather than with section 69941 of the California 
Government Code, which authorizes superior court judges to appoint 
official reporters."' The court considered section 269 as the keystone of 
the "statutory scheme of making an official record"139 and, therefore, 
began its statutory survey with this code section.140 The pivot of the 
court's reasoning is the incorrect premise that statutory law lays down a 
general requirement that something called the "official record" be taken 
down exclusively by official reporters. 141 According to the court, the fact 
135. Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
136. See id. at 5 I. 
137. Id. (quoting CAL. C!v. PROC. CODE § 269(a) (West Supp. 1994) (current 
version available at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999))). 
138. See CAL. Gov'TCODE § 69941 (West 1997). 
139. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5 I. The court did acknowledge that the LACRAA 
court "held that section 269 does not require that the official reporter make the record of 
superior court proceedings, unless requested by a party or the judge." Id. at 52. 
However, the court did not squarely address the inconsistency between the LA CRAA 
court's narrow view of section 269 and the court's broad view that places the emphasis 
on the mandatory aspects of section 269. The CCRA I opinion merely stated, "This 
conclusion is consistent with the opinion of the Legislative Counsel holding that section 
269 requires that superior court proceedings be taken down by an official shorthand 
reporter if a request is made." Id. 
140. See id. at 51 ("Several statutes comprise the statutory scheme of making an 
official record. Subdivision (a) of section 269 sets out the basic provisions for 
requesting an official superior court record."). Based upon the original 1861 statute from 
which these two code sections derive, statutory analysis should begin with section 69941 
of the California Code of Government. All other code sections relied upon by the court 
are applicable only if the superior court decides, in its discretion, to appoint an official 
reporter. This view is consistent with Judge Staniforth' s trial court opinion that the first 
appellate district court reversed in CCRA I. See id. at 47. 
141. The court referred to an "existing statutory scheme providing for the official 
record to be taken down in shorthand," and to a legislative intent that "[superior court] 
proceedings be stenographically recorded by official shorthand reporters." Id. at 55. 
The flaw in the court's reasoning is that none of the statutes relied upon by the court to 
support its inference of a "statutory scheme providing for the official record to be taken 
down in shorthand" refers to an "official record." Rather, the statutes refer to an 
"official reporter." See, e.g., CAL. C!v. PROC. CODE § 273 (West Supp. 1999) ("The 
report of the official reporter ... of any court, ... when transcribed and certified as being 
a correct transcript of the testimony and proceedings in the case, is prima facie evidence 
of such testimony and proceedings."). There is no general statutory requirement that 
77 
that the Legislature has enacted statutory exceptions to this general 
requirement-authorizing electronic recording in "certain" limited 
circumstances142-indicates a legislative intent to preempt the Judicial 
Council and the courts from usinr. electronic recording unless expressly 
authorized by the Legislature. 43 The CCRA court discerned a 
"legislative pattern [that] suggests that while electronic recording is 
sometimes proper, the normal practice is that a shorthand reporter is to 
create the official record unless statutory law provides otherwise. "144 
The CCRA I decision involved questionable reasoning in at least three 
respects. First, the court drew upon inapposite administrative agency 
case law that considers legislative rejection of an agency proposal 
identical to the challenged agency regulation as "persuasive" evidence 
that the regulation is not "consistent with controlling legislation. "14' 
Thus, the court concluded, "In our case, the Judicial Council's attempt to 
obtain legislative amendment of the existing statutory scheme suggests 
that its present interpretation of that scheme as consistent with the rules 
it promulgated after rejection of the amendments is shaky, at best."146 
Second, the court determined that the Judicial Council's unsuccessful 
legislative efforts to secure the enactment of express blanket 
authorization amounts to an implied admission by conduct "that 
legislative authorization is needed before electronic recording of 
superior court proceedings may be made."141 The court reached this 
courts maintain any verbatim record, official or otherwise. Section 269(a) of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure leaves that decision in the hands of the parties and 
the judge, along with the decision whether to employ the services of an official reporter 
to make the verbatim record. See CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE§ 269(a). 
142. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54. 
143. See id. For an expanded critique of the court's reasoning, see Koppel, Push-
Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 170-85. 
144. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54 (emphasis added). 
145. Id. at 56. 
146. Id. (emphasis added). The court's reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, 
the Judicial Council is not an administrative agency created by the Legislature whose 
rules of court must be "consistent with controlling legislation." The Council is a 
constitutionally-constituted administrative agency of the California judiciary vested with 
the power to promulgate rules of "court administration, practice and procedure, not 
inconsistent with statute." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (emphasis added). Second, the 
challenged rules of court were more limited in scope than the rejected amendments 
mentioned by the court. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56. Whereas the authorization 
conferred on superior courts by the Council's Electronic Recording Rules was limited to 
two circumstances (where neither party objected or where an official reporter was 
"unavailable"), the authorization contained in the Isenberg bill (A.B. 2937) was not so 
limited. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 173. 
147. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56. The court's reasoning fails to consider that the 
Council and the Legislature exercise concurrent rulemaking power over court 
administration. In the absence of clear statutory indication that electronic recording of 
proceedings is forbidden in superior court, the Judicial Council has the power-
concurrent with the Legislature-to promulgate rules that provide the courts with 
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dubious conclusion despite its concession that, "[a]s evidence of 
legislative intent, unadopted proposals have been held to have little 
value."14' Third, although the court acknowledged "the difficulties of 
determining the meaning of legislative rejection of proposed 
amendments to existing statute," it nevertheless relied upon such 
"legislative rejection" to reinforce its "interpretation of the existing 
statutory scheme."14' 
b. CCRAII 
Upon remand from CCRA /, Judge Garcia of the superior court in 
Alameda County enjoined the use of any gublic funds for any 
"nonstenographic method"''° of court recording. 1 1 The Judicial Council 
appealed Judge Garcia's judgment, contending that the injunction 
exceeded the scope of CCRA I, which invalidated the Electronic 
Recording Rules but did not prohibit electronic recording under any 
circumstances."' The court in CCRA I/ affirmed Judge Garcia's 
express authorization to use electronic recording. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, 
supra note 20, at 142-45, 164-65. The existence of legal authority in the Council to act 
on its own does not mean that the Council should exercise that power unnecessarily. The 
delicate political relationship between the courts and the Legislature, upon which courts 
are dependent for funding, may counsel a diplomatic deference to the Legislature in the 
spirit of comity. See supra note 78. 
148. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55. 
149. Id. at 56 ("However, we cannot ignore the fact that the Legislature's rejection 
of the Judicial Council's proposed amendments js in accord with our interpretation of the 
existing statutory scheme."). To the extent that the court's reasoning relies on legislative 
rejection of electronic recording statutes, that reasoning is flawed because it ignores the 
legislative dysfunction that enables a single-minded interest group to use its inordinate 
lobbying power to trump the public interest. Public Choice scholarship challenges the 
myth that competition among interest groups in the Legislature produces public interest 
legislation. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 138-40. 
150. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529,531 (Ct. App. 1997). 
151. See id. at 530-31. 
152. See id. at 531. In CCRA I, plaintiff CCRA accomplished service of process 
upon only three parties as defendants: the Judicial Council and two administrative 
officers. Upon remand (after the CCRA I decision in favor of CCRA) to Judge Garcia 
for entry of judgment, plaintiff CCRA moved to join as additional defendants the other 
county superior courts in order that these courts would be directly bound by Judge 
Garcia's judgment. See Notice of Motion to Vacate Judgment and for Leave to File 
Amended Petition, CCRA I (No. 728173-6). Although Judge Garcia denied the CCRA's 
motion, see Order Denying Petitioners' Motion to Amend, CCRA I (No. 728173-6), his 
ultimate judgment enjoined the Judicial Council "from authorizing and from causing the 
expenditure of public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a nonstenographic 
method and system for preparing the official verbatim record of superior court 
proceedings," thereby resolving the entire case as pied in the original petition. 
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sweeping injunction and broadly construed its own holding in CCRA I, 
stating, "The holding of CCRA I is a simple one: the Legislature has not 
authorized the creation of an official superior court record by electronic 
means under any circumstances."'" The court then concluded with a 
sharply worded rebuke to the Judicial Council for arguing a narrow 
interpretation of the CCRA I holding, writing: 
Given this clear ruling, we are at a loss to determine why the Judicial Council 
continues to dispute the obvious implications of it-that it has no justification to 
permit electronic recording as a method of creating the official record of 
superior court proceedings, no authority to promulgate rules authorizing such 
recording and no power to spend taxpayers' funds to do that which has been 
held to be inconsistent with the Legislature's intent. 154 
3. The View from the Second Appellate District: 
People v. Turner (November 1998) 
In People v. Turner,"' a criminal defendant argued on appeal that the 
preparation of a verbatim record of his superior court trial through 
electronic recording technology, rather than by a certified shorthand 
reporter, violated his rights156 under the Equal Protection Clause'" and 
the Due Process Clause'" of the United States Constitution, and under 
section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure.'" In this case, 
the second appellate district found "no error in the [trial court's] use of 
the electronic recording device.""'' Addressing the appellant's statutory 
argument, the court saw "no need to independently analyze the 
correctness of the result reached in [ CCRA 1]"161 because the court found 
that Turner had expressly waived at trial whatever statutory right he had 
"to have the proceedings recorded and prepared by a certified shorthand 
Judgment, CCRA I (No. 728173-6) (stating decision of Hon. David A. Garcia, Judge of 
the Alameda County Superior Court, dated Nov. I, 1996). On appeal, the Judicial 
Council argued that this judgment-restraining the expenditure of public funds by 
superior courts to finance any use of electronic recording-exceeded the holding in 
CCRA I, which holding merely invalidated the challenged Electronic Recording Rules. 
See Opening Brief of Appellant at 13, CCRA II (No. 728173-6). In support, the Judicial 
Council pointed out that "the Court's Opinion [in CCRA /] expressed no disagreement 
with the holding of the Court of Appeal in the LACRAA case." Id. 
153. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531. 
154. Id. 
155. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 1998). 
156. See id. at 743. 
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
158. Id. 
159. CAL. C!v. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1994) (amended 1998). 
160. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745. 
161. Id. at 744. 
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reporter. "162 
The Turner decision is significant for two reasons. First, the court 
held that whatever right a party has to a certified shorthand reporter 
under CCRA J's interpretation of section 269(a) can be expressly waived 
by that party, thereby enabling the superior court to legally record tbe 
proceedings electronically. 1• 3 Because appellant Turner had expressly 
waived his statutory rights under section 269, there was no need for the 
court to consider the question, addressed in the LACRAA decision, 
whether a party's failure to request an official reporter would similarly 
permit a superior court to make an electronic record.164 Second, the 
Turner decision is important for the words it chose to describe the CCRA 
/ opinion, clearly calling into question tbe "correctness of the result" in 
CCRA /. 165 The court wrote: 
In reaching this decision [in CCRA /], the court and the California Court 
Reporters Association each conceded "that there is no statute expressly 
prohibiting a superior court from making an official record by electronic means, 
rather than by using certified shorthand reporters or expressly mandating that 
the official superior court record be made by shorthand reporters." [The] result 
[in CCRA /] was based on a statutory interpretation by the court that the 
Legislature "implicitly" intended that the record be made by certified shorthand 
reporters rather than by electronic recording. 166 
162. Id. 
I 63. See id. The Turner opinion, issued November 20, 1998, does not indicate the 
date of the superior court proceeding that appellant claimed was electronically recorded 
in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. For purpose of context, recall the 
chronology: CCRA I was decided on October 1995, Judge Garcia issued his injunction in 
November 1996, the Judicial Council repealed the Electronic Recording Rules and 
issued its directive prohibiting the expenditure of state funds to operate and maintain 
electronic recording equipment to make the official superior court record in January 
1997, and CCRA II affirmed Judge Garcia's injunction on December 3, 1997. See supra 
Part II.C.1-2. 
I 64. The Turner court noted that a criminal defendant appearing in propria persona 
must be apprised of his right, under In re Annstrong, 178 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Ct. App. 1981), 
to a verbatim record-but not necessarily to a verbatim record prepared by shorthand. 
See Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743 ("We conclude that appellant has failed to 
demonstrate a violation of constitutional proportions merely because an electronic 
recording device was employed instead of a certified shorthand reporter."). The court 
pointed out, however, that "a verbatim record is implicitly among the rights of which a 
defendant appearing in propria persona must be apprised." Id. at 745. 
165. Id. at 744. 
I 66. Id. ( citations omitted). 
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4. The "Unpublished" View from the Fourth Appellate District: 
Gandall v. Grimes (August 1998) 
In Gandall v. Grimes,161 an unpublished opinion168 decided eight 
months after CCRA 11, the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the 
use of electronic recording to ma.lee a verbatim record in a civil case in 
Orange County Superior Court, relying squarely on the fifth appellate 
district's IACRAA decision. Gandall was the plaintiff in a malpractice 
action. After losing at trial, Gandall argued "paradoxical[ly ]" on appeal 
essentially that he could not appeal16' -this because "the keeping of the 
trial record via electronic recording denie[ d] him his right to appeal." 110 
Gandall claimed that he had agreed to the electronic recording of the 
trial proceedings in reasonable reliance on the Judicial Council's 
Electronic Recording Rules without knowing that the Rules had been 
invalidated in CCRA 1. 111 The Fourth District Court of Appeal both 
affirmed the lower court ruling and "reject[ed] [the] plaintiffs efforts to 
torpedo his own appeal."172 The court also stated that, notwithstanding 
CCRA 1, the electronic recording was "permissible" under the fifth 
appellate district's LA CRAA decision, since "[ n ]either the litigants nor 
the court here requested shorthand reporting under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 269 or otherwise."173 The court further held that 
"nothing in the rules of appellate practice, as best we can discern, 
precludes the use of electronic recordings in the production of reporter's 
transcripts for purposes of appeal."174 
The Gandall decision represents a rather bold statement about 
electronic recording. Note that the CCRA I opinion was rendered after 
Gandall's trial but before his appeal."' Therefore, the Fourth District 
167. No. 0017121 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1998). 
168. In California, not all appellate opinions are published. A court of appeal may 
decide not to certify an opinion for publication because it fails to meet the requirements 
for publication set forth in Rule 976 of the California Rules of Court. An unpublished 
opinion may "not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action" except as 
otherwise provided in Rule 977(b). CAL. R. Cr. 977(a). Opinions that a court of appeal 
certifies for publication may be depublished by order of the California Supreme Court 
pursuant to Rule 976(c) and 979. CAL. R. Cr. 976(c), 979. For a critical analysis of the 
Supreme Court's depublication practice, see generally Stephen R. Barnett. Making 
Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme 
Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033 (1993). 
169. Gandall, slip op. at 3. 
170. Id. at 2. 
171. See id. "[Gandall's attorney] [did] not question the accuracy or veracity of the 
reporter's transcripts" that were derived from the videotape. Id. at 5. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 4. 
174. Id. at 5. 
175. See id. at 3. 
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Court of Appeal could have affirmed the trial court's use of electronic 
recording on a narrow basis that avoided any reliance on IACRAA. The 
trial court had electronically recorded Gandall's trial proceedings 
pursuant to the authority granted superior courts by the Judicial 
Council's Electronic Recording Rules which had not yet been 
invalidated by the CCRA I decision. The court of appeal could have 
simply refused to apply CCRA I retroactively. Instead, the fourth 
appellate district court chose to make a statement-albeit an unpublished 
one-about the legality of using electronic recording in superior court in 
the aftermath of CCRA I and II and the repeal of the Electronic 
Recording Rules. Indeed, the court characterized CCRA I as a "dubious" 
decision176 and narrowly confined its holding, writing: 
The precise holding in the dubious [ CCRA I] decision is simply that the Judicial 
Council lacked authority to promulgate rules concerning electronic reporting 
once Code of Civil Procedure section 270 (which mandated the temporary 
experimental use of electronic recording [under the "demonstration project"] in 
certain superiorcourts)expired on January 1, 1994. 177 
D. The Coincidence of the CCRA II Decision and the Advent 
of State Funding of California Trial Courts Finally 
Silences Electronic Recording in the Los Angeles 
County Superior Courts 
By the end of 1997, all sound recording of proceedings in Los Angeles 
County Superior Court ceased, except in one courtroom. 178 That Los 
Angeles County----of all counties in California-has effectively "thrown 
in the towel" on electronic recording is ironic. The 1995 IACRAA 
decision, based on the same statutes reviewed by the CCRA court, 
expressly held that the Los Angeles County Superior Court practice of 
176. Id. at 4. 
177. Id. In an unpublished 1997 decision, rendered after the Judicial Council issued 
its January 1997 directive but before the first appellate district decided CCRA II, the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected an attack-based on CCRA I-on the use of 
electronic recording in Orange County Superior Court. See Garrett v. Superior Court, 
No. G021612 (Cal. Ct. App. filed May 22, 1997). In Garrett, the Court denied, without 
opinion, a petition for a writ of mandate to compel an Orange County Superior Court 
judge, during a videotaped trial, "to perform [her] duty to maintain a proper record by a 
court reporter," rather than by videotape. Petition for Writ of Mandate to Compel 
Enforcement During Trial of the Legal Duty to Maintain a Proper Record by a Court 
Reporter, or Other Appropriate Writ; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
Thereof at 3, Garrett (No. G021612). 
178. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at BI. 
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using electronic recording to make a record of general proceedings, 
where neither party nor the court requested a certified shorthand 
reporter, is not prohibited by statute. Electronic recording of superior 
court proceedings in Los Angeles County survived the sunset of the 
demonstration project in January 1994, survived the 1995 CCRA I 
decision, survived Judge Garcia's November 1996 injunction, survived 
the 1997 CCRA II decision, and even survived the Judicial Council's 
January 1997 directive ordering superior courts to cease spending state 
funds to support electronic recording to make the "official" record."' As 
discussed below, the straw that finally broke the back of electronic 
recording in Los Angeles County Superior Court was the enactment of 
the landmark Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997.180 
Eight months after the Judicial Council directed the superior courts to 
cease spending state funds to maintain and operate electronic recording 
devices, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 233 (the Lockyer-
Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997). The Act effectively shifted 
responsibility for the funding of court operations from the counties to the 
state effective July 1, 1997 .1' 1 Prior to this change,"' "the costs of court 
179. As late as July 1996, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors "approved 
four three-year contracts awarded by the Los Angeles Superior Court to firms that 
currently provide electronic recording services in lieu of traditional shorthand court 
reporters." Greene, supra note 11, at 5. Greene explains, ''The board voted unanimously 
to approve the contracts for as-needed services over the objections of Los Angeles 
Superior Court Reporters Association representatives, who asserted that the action puts 
the county's 'imprimatur' on illegal expenditures of public funds." Id. 
180. Ch. 850, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4737 (West) (A.B. 233); see Rebecca Liss, 
Court Workers Face Layoffs by New Year's, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 21, 1997, at I ("The 
recent landmark reform in the state's trial court funding system may result in the 
elimination of electronic recording of proceedings in Los Angeles Superior Courts come 
Jan[ uary] I, and the layoff of approximately 80 monitors who operate the equipment."). 
The Judicial Council urged the Legislature to enact state funding to promote judicial 
self-governance. See Ronald M. George, Message from the Chief Justice (visited Apr. 
15, 1998) <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courtnews/10961196/message.htm>. The Chief 
Justice wrote: 
Since I became Chief Justice five months ago, I have focused on many 
critical issues .... My top priority, however, has been the establishment of a 
stable and adequate funding source for the California trial courts that will 
permit our justice system to effectively serve the people of this state . 
. . . [T]he Judicial Council is taking every possible step to tum state trial 
court funding into a reality this year .... 
Id.; see also Ronald M. George, Message from the Chief Justice: Courts Are Leading the 
Move to Restore Public Confidence in the Judicial System, CT NEWS-JUD. COUNCIL OF 
CAL., Feb.-Mar. 1997, at 2 ("Funding and self-governance: As we enter the 21st century, 
the most crucial issue looming before the judiciary is stable funding for the trial courts, 
which is inexorably linked to the courts' ability to be independent and self-governing."). 
An unintended consequence of state funding was to undermine judicial self-governance 
to the extent that state funding deprived courts of the ability to control their own record. 
181. See Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, ch. 850, sec. 46, art. 3, 
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operations were shared between the state and the counties. "183 In 
essence, Assembly Bill 233 "relieves counties of any direct 
responsibility to fund trial court operations costs."184 
The mechanism of the Act is somewhat elaborate. First, each county 
is required to remit to the state a set amount of money which is "based 
on an amount expended by the respective county for court operations 
during the 1994-95 fiscal year. "1" The funds so remitted by the counties 
to the state are deposited in the State Trial Court Trust Fund. After the 
Legislature makes its annual appropriation to the Judicial Council, 
"based on the recommendations of the Trial Court Budget Commission, 
as approved by the Judicial Council,""' the Judicial Council allocates 
appropriated funds among the respective counties.1" Each county then 
deposits the state funds into a special Trial Court Operations Fund, 
within the county treasury, "which ... operate[s] as a special revenue 
fund." 188 Ultimately, these state-allocated funds cover the costs of local 
court operations. 
In the aftermath of the funding legislation, the County of Los Angeles 
reassessed the practice of electronic court reporting. The County, facing 
various limitations imposed by the new funding system, expressed 
concern over the high cost of salaried persons called "monitors" used in 
the sound recording process.1" At some point, the Los Angeles County 
§ 77200, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4754 ("Article 3 ... is added ... to read ... § 77200. 
On and after July 1, 1997, the state shall assume sole responsibility for the funding of 
court operations .... "). 
182. See ch. 850, sec. 27, § 68073, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4745. This document 
reads: 
Id. 
Section 68073 of the Government Code is amended to read: 
... Commencing July I, 1997, and each year thereafter, no county or city 
and county shall be responsible to provide funding for 'court operations' as 
defined in Section 77003 and Rule 810 of the California Rules of Court as it 
read on July 1, 1996. 
183. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ASSEMBLY BILL 233 COMMENTARY 
48 (1997). 
184. Id. at 49. 
185. Ch. 850, sec. 46, art. 3, § 77201, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4754. 
186. Ch. 850, sec. 46, art. 3, § 77202, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4761. 
187. See ch. 850, sec. 46, art. 3, § 77207, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4763 ("The 
Legislature shall appropriate trial court funding. The Controller shall apportion trial 
court funding payments to the courts pursuant to an allocation schedule adopted by the 
Judicial Council in four quarterly installments."). 
188. Ch. 850, sec. 44, § 77009, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4753. 
189. See Liss, supra note 180, at I ('"If we don't find a way to pay for the 
electronic recording monitors with money other than that from the state, we will have to 
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Board of Supervisors apparently became unwilling to appropriate the 
two million dollars in excess of the county's required contribution to the 
State Trial Court Trust Fund to continue the practice of electronic 
recording in superior court. 190 Los Angeles County superior court 
administrators also believed that Judge Garcia's injunction and the 
Judicial Council directive forbade them from spending state funds to 
finance electronic recording1' 1 and, after July 1, 1997, state monies 
became the only available source of funding for the courts in Los 
Angeles County. For these reasons, in 1998 the Los Angeles County 
Superior Court hired fifty additional court reporters to replace electronic 
recording equipment. 192 
Interestingly, Orange County took a different path, choosing to 
continue to utilize electronic court reporting. Why is the situation 
different in Orange County? The answer is that video, rather than sound, 
recording equipment was installed in Orange County superior courts in 
the waning years of the demonstration project. Video recording 
equipment is cheaper to operate than sound recording equipment 
because it does not require the use of salaried court monitors-this 
because speakers in court are visually self-identified without the need of 
a monitor to keep a log.1" As long as the video recording equipment 
does not break down, its operation is affordable enough to be supported 
by county funds and user fees. 194 
hire more court reporters,' [Los Angeles Superior Court Presiding Judge] Parkin said."). 
Id. 
190. See id. at I. Liss reported: 
In order to continue using the electronic recording systems for the 
remainder of the fiscal year, the court needs to come up with $2 million in 
funds not supplied by the state, according to Los Angeles Superior Court 
Presiding Judge Robert W. Parkin. 
Parkin said ... that unless the money is found in the next six weeks, 35 
county workers and an additional 45 contract workers will lose their jobs by 
New Year's Day . 
. . . The [ electronic recording] system costs approximately $4 million per 
fiscal year to operate in 80 courtrooms. 
191. See Telephone Interview with Juanita Blankenship, Administrator, Litigation 
Support Services, Los Angeles Superior Court (Jan. 5, 1999). 
192. See Ruling Barring Electronic Court Reporting Will Cost Superior Court $5.5 
Million Annually, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE; CAPITOL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 16, 
1998, at I. 
193. See Miller, supra note 26, at I (''The California Judicial Council, in a 1992 
report to the Legislature on several pilot projects, estimated that each video-recorded 
courtroom could save about $41,000 per year, and each audio-recorded courtroom-
which requires an employee to monitor the equipment----<:ould save about $28,000 
annually."). 
194. See Memorandum from Alan Slater, Executive Officer, Clerk of the Orange 
County Superior Court, to Hon. Kathleen E. O'Leary, Presiding Judge et al. (Jan. 7, 
1998) (on file with author). Slater wrote: 
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On September 27, 1999, Orange County Superior Court terminated the 
use of electronic recording equipment to make the official verbatim 
record in general jurisdiction proceedings, but not because it believed 
electronic recording of superior court proceedings is illegal. In August 
1999, the Judicial Council made the court an offer it could not refuse in 
the form of a $1,132,176 subsidy to re-hire sixteen court reporters to 
replace electronic recording equipment that has been functioning well in 
thirteen Orange County courtrooms for almost a decade. 1" Statewide, 
the Judicial Council allocated a total of $8,009,935 in fiscal year 1999-
2000 to turn back the clock, technologically, in California courtrooms 
pursuant to the Judicial Council's "ER/Verbatim Reporting Conversion 
Program."196 
The final nail in the coffin of electronic recording in Orange County 
The Judicial Council has in fact, based on the op1mon in CCRA I, 
expressly forbidden the use of State funds to support "electronic recording" 
(ER). In response to this directive this court has relied on county funds to 
support our ER program. Despite the shift from primary county funding to 
primary state funding which has now occurred with the passage of AB233, it is 
my opinion that sufficient funding from local revenue sources will be available 
to allow this court to maintain current video recording systems. Other trial 
courts which have employed audio electronic recording monitors (ERMs) to 
manage their audio electronic systems find themselves in the unfortunate 
position of having no authorized funds with which to pay the salaries, 
employee benefits or contract fees of those individuals serving as ERMs, 
unless a county Board of Supervisors voluntarily opts to continue county 
funding. Similarly, no authorized funding is available to replace the audio 
systems with the more cost effective video recording systems. Ironically, 
funding for the additional use of CSRs to replace ER Systems is not available 
in the current State allocation for the balance of [fiscal year] 1997 /98, nor is it 
included in the budgets tentatively approved by the Judicial Council and 
submitted to the Governor for funding in [fiscal year] 1998/99. 
Therefore, the current situation regarding the use of our JA VS Video 
Court Documentation Systems seems quite different than that which other 
courts might be facing. Since the systems were all previously purchased and 
we do not employ or need ERMs to operate our video recording systems, I 
believe we will be able to sustain our video recording systems in their current 
configuration without using state funds. However, in the future, we may not 
be able to replace a system if it should fail or need the replacement of critical 
components. 
Id. at 2-3. 
195. See Proposed Trial Court Funding Allocations for Fiscal Year 1999-2000 
(unpublished table) (on file with author); see also Letter from Marlene Nelson, 
Executive Director, Fiscal Services, Orange County Superior Court, to author (July 28, 
1999) (on file with author). 
196. See Proposed Trial Court Funding Allocations for Fiscal Year 1999-2000, 
supra note 195. 
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Superior Court was the formal request to the court by California's 
Administrative Director of the Courts to "cease its use of any electronic 
recording for purposes of creating the official verbatim record, except in 
limited civil cases, misdemeanors, and infractions."
197 
The price-tag to 
California taxpayers for rehiring court reporters to sit in courtrooms 
wired to electronically record proceedings was $8,009,935.198 The cost 
in terms of judicial independence is incalculable. 
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING IN 
CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT 
Detailed analysis of the statutes and decisions leads to the conclusion 
that CCRA I is wrongly decided and should be either disavowed by other 
courts of appeal or, alternatively, narrowly construed to avoid conflict 
with LACRAA. This section develops these points in three subsections. 
First, Part III.A describes the conflict between the holding of CCRA I, as 
broadly construed in CCRA II, and the LACRAA decision. 
Next, Part III.B summarizes an earlier critique of the CCRA 
197. Letter from William C. Vickrey to Kathleen E. O'Leary, supra note 16, at 2; 
see Memorandum from Kathleen E. O'Leary to Judges Bauer et al., supra note 14, at 1-
2. Referring Lo the Judicial Council's formal request that Orange County Superior Court 
terminate electronic recording to make the official record in general jurisdiction 
proceedings, Judge O'Leary states, in part: 
Id. 
This most recent communication [from William C. Vickrey, Administrative 
Director of the Courts] clearly indicates for the first time that in the opinion of 
the Executive and Planning Committee, speaking for the Judicial Council 
pursuant to CCRC, rule 6.11 ( d), that our current practices with respect to the 
funding of electronic recording through locally generated revenue is 
"inconsistent with the judgment" against the Judicial Council in CCRA II. ... 
While reasonable minds can differ as to the propriety of the use of 
electronic recording and some may believe that the request from the Judicial 
Council does not constitute a mandate upon the court or any individual judge, I 
believe that we should comply with the Judicial Council's request that we 
cease our use of any electronic recording for purposes of creating the official 
record, except in limited civil cases, misdemeanors and infractions .... 
Regardless of the opinion of individual judicial officers as to the propriety 
of the use of electronic recording, I think all of the judicial officers of this 
court would agree that the use and funding of electronic recording has long 
been a source of controversy in our court. I think efforts to prolong the 
argument and to allow the controversy in our court to continue is not in 
anyone's best interest. 
198. See supra note 195. Judge O'Leary acknowledged that many Orange County 
judges question the wisdom of spending over a million dollars to re-convert Orange 
County courtrooms to court reporters but noted that "[t]he question as to whether these 
funds could be put to better use is not ours to answer." Memorandum from Kathleen E. 
O'Leary to Judges Bauer et al., supra note 14, at I. 
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decisions'" and demonstrates that the superior courts do not require 
express statutory authorization to use electronic recording to make a 
verbatim record. Part IILB discusses and endorses the analysis of Judge 
Staniforth, whose judgment upholding the validity of the Judicial 
Council's Electronic Recording Rules was reversed in CCRA /. Under 
this analysis, which uses section 69941 of the California Government 
Code as its starting point, superior courts are not required to appoint any 
official reporters. Section 69941 merely authorizes superior courts to 
appoint official reporters. Therefore, superior courts may choose to 
utilize electronic means to record proceedings whenever an official 
reporter is "unavailable" or when neither party requests an official 
reporter. Under this line of reasoning, a superior court retains the option 
to electronically record proceedings in lieu of an official reporter, even 
where a party requests an official reporter, as long as the court finds that 
an official reporter is "unavailable. "200 
Finally, Part IILC provides an alternative approach that reconciles 
CCRA I and LACRAA by narrowly construing the holding of CCRA I. 
This analysis adopts LACRAA's statutory interpretation of the court 
reporting statutes, which is a bit broader than Judge Staniforth' s but still 
much narrower than CCRA I's interpretation. LA CRAA' s statutory 
interpretation, like CCRA J's,2°' begins with section 269(a) of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure but, unlike CCRA I, LACRAA 
interprets section 269(a) literally to "require[] . . . that the official 
reporter 'take down' civil proceedings only if requested by either party 
or the judge; the official reporter need not 'take down' a record when no 
request is made."202 Under LACRAA's statutory analysis, the superior 
court's discretion is more limited than under Judge Staniforth's analysis. 
LACRAA interprets section 269(a) to oblige the superior court to provide 
an official reporter when requested by a party. Under UCRAA's 
analysis, a superior court cannot use electronic recording to make the 
record in lieu of an official reporter where one is requested. Nothing in 
LACRAA, however, prohibits a superior court from using electronic 
recording in addition to a requested official reporter. 
199. For an expanded critique of the CCRA decisions, see Koppel, Push-Comes-to-
Shove, supra note 20, at 140-86. 
200. Repealed Rule 980.3 defined "unavailability" broadly. See supra note 122. 
20 I. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
202. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
341, 344 (Ct. App. 1995) ( emphasis added). 
89 
A. The Conflict Between CCRA I, as Construed by 
CCRA II, and LACRAA 
In CCRA II, the first appellate district broadly construed its own 
holding in CCRA I that places CCRA I in direct conflict with the holding 
of the fifth appellate district in LACRAA. As construed in CCRA II, 
CCRA I holds that the use of electronic recording under any 
circumstances to make the official verbatim record of superior court 
proceedings is inconsistent with statute.203 Under LACRAA's holding, it 
is not inconsistent with statute for a superior court to make an electronic 
recording of general proceedings where neither party, nor the court, 
requests the services of an official reporter. 204 
Both CCRA I and LACRAA are based upon a review of the same 
statutes.'°' Although the CCRA I court conceded that "there is no statute 
[that] expressly prohibit[s] a superior court from making an official 
record by electronic means," the court proceeded to find a "statutory 
scheme [which] addresses the making of the official record in such a 
manner as to suggest that the Legislature implicitly intended that this 
record be made by certified shorthand reporters rather than by electronic 
recording."206 Such an implied statutory scheme that broadly preempts 
judicial power over the court record is not articulated in legislative 
history, and is contrary to the permissive statutory structure established 
by the original 1861 court reporting statute that makes available to 
courts and litigants technological options for making the court record. 201 
The implied statutory scheme invented by the CCRA I court squarely 
conflicts with LACRAA's narrow, literal, interpretation of the same court 
reporting statutes. LACRAA holds that there is no 
explicit or implicit legislative command contained in those specific statutes ... 
[that prohibits superior courts] from choosing to maintain a record of general 
civil proceedings by means of electronic recording devices where neither the 
court nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken by an official 
shorthand reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269.208 
203. See CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 1997). 
204. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass 'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50. 
205. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
206. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 51 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). 
207. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.. 
208. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass 'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349-50 
(emphasis added). For a summary of the LACRAA court's literal analysis of the same 
statutes relied upon by the CCRA court, see supra note 127. 
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B. CCRA I Was Wrongly Decided and Should Not Be 
Followed in Other Districts 
CCRA I erroneously implied a statutory scheme that "suggests" a 
fictional legislative intent (1) to prevent local superior courts from 
exercising their inherent power to determine whether and how to prepare 
a verbatim record of proceedings, and (2) to preempt the Judicial 
Council's exercise of its constitutional authority to promulgate rules of 
court that provide a uniform statewide policy re~lating the use of 
electronic recording to make a superior court record. 
Superior courts require no express statutory authorization to use 
electronic recording to make a verbatim record. No statute expressly 
prohibits a superior court from using electronic recording technology to 
make a verbatim record, nor does any statute require the superior court 
to make an "official record. "210 The phrase "official verbatim record" 
was introduced into California's legal lexicon by California Rule of 
Court 980.3,211 which rule CCRA I held to be invalid. 212 In addition to 
authorizing electronic recording in superior court, Rule 980.3 imposed 
on superior courts "an obligation to maintain an adequate record of oral 
Id. 
209. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55. The court wrote, 
The fact that the Legislature has by statute authorized electronic recording 
in some contexts suggests strongly that-unless the existing statutory scheme 
providing for the official record to be taken down in shorthand is amended-
the Legislature does not intend that electronic recording of superior court 
proceedings be the method of creating an official record. 
210. Statutory law does not refer to a verbatim record of proceedings prepared by 
an official reporter as "the official record." See, e.g., CAL. CN. PROC. CODE§ 269 (West 
Supp. 1999) (''The official reporter . . . shall . . . take down in shorthand all 
testimony .... "); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 273(a) (West Supp. 1999) (''The report of the 
official reporter ... is prima facie evidence of [the] testimony and proceedings."); CAL. 
Gov'TCODE 69952(a) (West Supp. 1999) (''The court may specifically direct the making 
of a verbatim record .... "); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 69955(a) (West 1997) ("Reporting 
notes are official records of the court."). A 1997 amendment to section 273 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure, which amendment makes an official reporter's 
certified transcript "prima facie evidence" of the testimony and proceedings in the case, 
introduced the phrase "official certified transcript." Act of Aug. 2, 1997, ch. 183, sec. 1, 
§§ 273(a), (b), 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 640, 641 (West) (A.B. 1372). This amendment 
provides that a rough draft of the official reporter's transcript "shall not be certified and 
cannot be used ... as the official certified transcript of the proceedings." Id. ( emphasis 
added). Therefore, it appears that "official certified transcript" means that transcript 
which is accorded prima facie evidence status under section 273 of the California Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
211. CAL. R. CT. 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997). 
212. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 56. 
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proceedings [ the 'official verbatim record of oral proceedings'] to permit 
reference and, when necessary, appellate review."213 When the Judicial 
Council repealed Rule 980.3, pursuant to Judge Garcia's injunction, the 
rule's requirement that a superior court maintain an official verbatim 
record died with it. 
CCRA I used section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
as the keystone of its statutory analysis to suggest greater legislative 
intrusion into the field of court recording than is warranted by a literal 
reading of the applicable statutes. CCRA J's analysis emphasized the 
concept of an "official record"-nowhere required by statute-which 
must be made by an official reporter, unless otherwise expressly 
provided by statute.214 To reinforce this broad statutory scheme, the 
CCRA court cited other statutes that regulate aspects of the office of 
official reporter, such as fees and salary, and that make the official 
reporter's certified transcript prima facie evidence (but not the only 
evidence) of the trial proceedings."' The court interpreted the two 
instances of express, but limited, statutory authorization of electronic 
recording21 ' as evidence of a legislative intent that any further extension 
of electronic recording be expressly authorized by statute.21 ' 
The logical starting point for an analysis of the statutory structure 
pertaining to court reporting is section 69941 of the California 
Government Code. This code section authorizes-but does not 
require-superior courts to appoint official reporters and provides 
213. CAL. R. CT. 980.3(a) (1996) (repealed 1997), quoted in CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at48 n.12. 
214. See supra note 209. 
215. See supra note 132. 
216. These two instances are section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
and section 72194.5 of the California Code of Government. Section 270, which expired 
on January I, 1994, authorized the Judicial Council to "establish a demonstration project 
to assess the costs, benefits, and acceptability of utilizing audio and video recording as a 
means of producing a verbatim record of proceedings in up to 75 superior court 
departments" and provided that, in demonstration courtrooms, "audio or video recording 
may be used in lieu of the verbatim record prepared by a court reporter except in any 
criminal or juvenile proceedings." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 270(a), (b) (West Supp. 
1999). Section 72194.5, enacted in 1975 to address a critical shortage of court reporters 
in municipal court, authorized the municipal courts to use electronic recording 
"[ w ]henever an official court reporter or a temporary court reporter is unavailable to 
report an action or proceeding." CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 72194.5 (West Supp. 1999). See 
generally notes 65-72, 81-85 and accompanying text. 
217. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54. The court stated: 
[W]henever the Legislature has intended that electronic recording be 
permitted, it has expressed that intent by specific statutory authorization. This 
legislative pattern suggests that while electronic recording is sometimes 
proper, the normal practice is that a shorthand reporter is to create the official 
record unless statutory law provides otherwise. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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judges and litigants the option to employ the official reporter's 
services."' The applicability of the remaining statutes cited in CCRA I, 
including section 269(a) (which prescribes the duty of an official 
reporter to take down proceedings in shorthand upon request of a party 
or the court),"' depends upon the court's appointment of an official 
reporter under section 69941 and upon a party's or the judge's request 
that an official reporter make a verbatim record. 220 
The two limited instances in which the Legislature has expressly 
authorized electronic recording are not exceptions that prove the 
existence of an all-encompassing statutory scheme that requires certified 
court reporters to make the "official" record. 221 There is no such all-
218. See CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 69941 (West 1997); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) 
(West Supp. 1999). This approach is consistent with the analysis of Judge Robert 0. 
Staniforth, whose trial court judgment sustained the validity of the Judicial Council's 
Electronic Recording Rules. Judge Staniforth's judgment was reversed by the First 
District Court of Appeal in CCRA I. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56. 
219. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999). 
220. Judge Staniforth explained: 
The appointment and selection of official reporters is by specific language 
of the statute a permissive, a discretionary function of the superior court judge. 
Thus, [section] 69941 should not be read to require the appointment of official 
reporters as the sole means for making official verbatim reporters [sic] of oral 
proceedings in the superior court. Had the Legislature intended mandatory 
appointment, it could have easily done so . 
. . . Particularly in light of Government Code [s]ection 69941, [s]ection 
269 cannot be read to mandate the appointment of an official reporter, nor does 
it govern the making of the official verbatim record of oral proceedings before 
the court where a court reporter is not available. I conclude Code of Civil 
Procedure [s]ection 269 does not require a contrary interpretation of [s]ection 
69941. 
Statement of Intended Decision 21-23, California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial 
Council (Alameda County Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1994) (No. 728173-6) (citations omitted). 
221. LACRAA interpreted section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and 
section 72194.5 of the California Code of Government as exceptions to the limited 
statutory requirement in sections 269(a) and 274(c) of the California O:ide of Civil 
Procedure, respectively, that "a verbatim record be taken by an official reporter ... 
where the judge or a party requested such a record." Los Angeles County Court 
Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 345-47 (Ct. App. 1995). 
LACRAA 's literal interpretation of section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
is supported by an Informal Opinion of the California Attorney General's Office. This 
document states: 
Nothing in section 270 indicates that the Legislature intended to limit the 
authority of the courts or departments not engaged in the demonstration project 
to provide for a record of its proceedings which may be authorized by other 
provisions of law .... 
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encompassing statutory scheme. Furthermore, the Legislature's failure 
to expressly authorize by statute electronic recording in superior court 
does not, a fortiori, support an inference that the Legislature intends to 
prevent such practice or intends to preempt the Judicial Council in this 
area. 
C. Alternatively, CCRA I Should Be Narrowly Confined to Its 
Facts to Provide Breathing Room for LACRAA 
An alternative to directly disavowing CCRA I is to disavow CCRA II' s 
broad construction of the holding in CCRA I that conflicts with 
IACRAA. This alternative would allow a court of appeal to align itself 
with the holding in IACRAA that statutory law does not prohibit a 
superior court from "choosing to maintain a record of general civil 
proceedings by means of electronic recording devices where neither the 
court nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken by an 
official shorthand reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269."222 
Recall that CCRA II broadly interpreted CCRA I's holding to prohibit 
"the creation of an official superior court record by electronic means 
under any circumstances."22' Clearly this broad holding conflicts with 
IACRAA's holding that the use of electronic recording to make a 
verbatim record in superior court is permissible when neither the judge 
nor a party requests an official reporter.224 
We conclude that there is no requirement for the attendance of a court 
reporter in any superior court proceeding except a criminal proceeding and a 
juvenile court proceeding before a juvenile court judge in the absence of a 
request by a party or an order of the court. 
Letter from Jack R. Winkler, Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Opinion Unit, Office 
of John K. Van De Kamp, Attorney General, to Frank S. Zolin, County Clerk - Executive 
Officer, The Superior Court for Los Angeles County 2-3 (Jan. 4, 1989). The letter was 
in response to "a request for an Attorney General's opinion on behalf of the judges of the 
Personnel and Budget Committee of the Los Angeles County Superior Court." Id. at 1. 
222. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass 'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349-50 
( emphasis added). 
223. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). 
224. Although CCRA I acknowledged the lACRAA opinion several times, CCRA I 
did not seriously attempt to reconcile the two decisions. Consider, for example, the 
following language from CCRA I referring to the IACCRA decision: 
One court has held that section 269 does not require that the official 
reporter make the record of superior court proceedings, unless requested by a 
party or the judge. This conclusion is consistent with the opinion of the 
Legislative Counsel holding that section 269 requires that superior court 
proceedings be taken down by an official shorthand reporter if a request is 
made. 
CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 52 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Also referring to the 
LA CCRA decision, the court wrote: 
94 
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There is a very reasonable and defensible interpretation of CCRA I 
that is more narrow than that adopted in CCRA II. This more narrow 
construction is simply that the Judicial Council's Electronic Recording 
Rules were inconsistent with statute and, therefore, an invalid exercise of 
the Judicial Council's rulemaking power under article VI, section 6 of 
the California Constitution. The Electronic Recording Rules might be 
said to have exceeded the superior court's statutory authorization (as 
held in IACRAA) on at least two grounds. First, the Electronic 
Recording Rules arguably exceeded statutory authority by purportedly 
authorizing electronic recording as a means of making the "official 
verbatim record of oral proceedings."22' CCRA I and II consistently use 
the term "official" record to distinguish its holding from IACRAA's.226 
The term "official" record also circumscribes the scope of both Judge 
Garcia's injunction22' and the Judicial Council's directive.'" The Los 
devices when there was no request that a certified shorthand reporter record 
those proceedings. It evaluated many of the statutes that CCRA now urges us 
to find comprise a statutory scheme-sections 269, 270 and 273; Government 
Code sections 68086, 69941, 69942, 69952, 69953 and 72194.5-but did not 
find these provisions established that the use of electronic recording was 
prohibited in superior courts if the parties or the judge did not request a 
certified shorthand reporter to make a record. Instead, it found these 
provisions to be consistent with section 269. The court characterized its 
holding as "very narrow"-"the court is not prohibited, by any explicit or 
implicit legislative command contained in those specific statutes cited by [the 
local association of certified shorthand reporters], from choosing to maintain a 
record of general civil proceedings by means of electronic recording devices 
where neither the court nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken 
by an official shorthand reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269." 
The Fifth District specifically declined to address certain other issues that 
CCRA, in an amicus brief. urged it to decide. Some of those issues are 
presented in our case. 
Id. at 55 n.19 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
225. CAL. R. CT. 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997) (emphasis added). 
226. See, e.g., CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55 ("[T]he Legislature does not intend 
that electronic recording of superior court proceedings be the method of creating an 
official record."); CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531 ("The holding of CCRA I is a simple 
one: The Legislature has not authorized the creation of an official superior court record 
by electronic means under any circumstances."). 
227. See California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council, No. 728173-6, slip 
op. at 1-2 (Alameda County Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 1996). The court wrote: 
2. It is HEREBY DECLARED that the use of nonstenographic methods 
for producing the OFFICIAL verbatim record of superior court proceedings are 
contrary to the intent of the Legislative [sic]. 
4. Furthermore, Respondent Judicial Council of California . . . [is J 
HEREBY ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from authorizing and from causing 
95 
Angeles Superior Court's gractice upheld in LACRAA did not employ 
the term "official" record,'' and LACRAA's holding refers to a "record 
of general civil proceedings" rather than "official record."230 
Second, the Electronic Recording Rules arguably exceeded statutory 
authority by stretching the definition of "unavailability." The Rules not 
only authorized the electronic recording of superior court proceedings 
when "the parties proceed with a hearing or trial in the absence of an 
official court reporter ... without objection""' (which was consistent 
with the practice of the Los Angeles Superior Court upheld in LACRAA), 
but also authorized electronic recording to make the "official verbatim 
record"232 of superior court civil proceedings "when an official reporter 
or official reporter pro tempore is unavailable."233 Rule 980.3(b) then 
broadly defined "unavailability" to include 
(2) when the court determines that the funds available for reporting services are 
insufficient to employ a qualified person for the position at the prevailing 
wage .... ; or 
(3) when the court determines that a reporter will be unavailable based on the 
court's existing staff of official court reporters, reasonable projections 
concerning official reporters' vacations, sick leaves, and other approved 
absences, and reasonable projections as to the workload in each of the court's 
departments. 234 
Put simply, this broad definition would not have been valid under 
LACRAA's holding that requires the superior court to provide an official 
reporter to a party who requests one. 
Therefore, under this more narrow interpretation of CCRA I and under 
the expenditure of public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a 
nonstenographic method and system for preparing the official verbatim record 
of superior court proceedings. 
Id. ( emphasis omitted) ( emphasis added). 
228. See Memorandum from William C. Vickrey to All Presiding and Sole Judges 
of the Superior Courts et al., supra note 9, at 2. This memorandum states, "The Judicial 
Council directs each superior court not to expend any of the upcoming [fiscal year] 96-
97 third quarter state funding distribution on the maintenance or creation of 
nonstenographic methods for preparing the official verbatim record of superior court 
proceedings." Id. (emphasis added). 
229. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 341, 342-43 (Ct. App. 1995) ("The petition challenged the court's practice of 
using electronic recording devices rather than certified court reporters to make a record 
of general civil proceedings where neither the assigned judge nor the parties requested 
that an official shorthand reporter record the proceedings.") ( emphasis added). 
230. Id. at 349-50 ("[T]he court is not prohibited ... from choosing to maintain a 
record of general civil proceedings by means of electronic recording devices where 
neither the court nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken by official 
shorthand reporter .... ") (emphasis added). 
231. CAL. R. CT. 980.3(c) (1996) (repealed 1997). 
232. Id. 980.3(a). 
233. Id. 980.3(b) (emphasis added). 
234. Id.; see supra note 122. 
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the clear holding of LACRAA, a superior court judge could make an 
electronic record of proceedings as long as the electronic recording is 
not called an "official record," and as long the court also provided an 
official reporter to any party who requested one. Under LACRAA's 
holding, state funds could legally be spent to maintain, and even expand, 
electronic recording facilities in superior courts without violating CCRA 
II, Judge Garcia's injunction,"' or the Judicial Council's January 1997 
directive236---each of which prohibits the expenditure of public funds to 
electronically prepare the "official" record.237 Until recently, Orange 
County Superior Court relied on limited county funds and user fees238 to 
235. See supra notes 45 & 47 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra note 48. 
237. Local courts can reallocate their "baseline" state funding. Therefore, with 
some exceptions, local superior courts have the flexibility to reallocate monies allocated 
by the Trial Court Budget Commission ("TCBC") for Court Operations Baseline Budget 
to operate and maintain electronic recording technology. See Letter from Marlene 
Nelson to author, supra note 195 ("[T]he Court has the ability to allocate and reallocate 
state provided funds as a general rule with a few exceptions."). However, the TCBC sets 
aside certain funds from a county-wide trial court system's baseline allocation that are 
earmarked for specific programs, like the Court Interpreter Program or the ER/Verbatim 
Reporting Conversion Program. If these earmarked funds are not spent for the specific 
purpose provided, they revert back to the State Trial Court Trust Fund. See id. 
Apparently, in shutting down its electronic recording equipment, the Los Angeles 
Superior Court mistakenly concluded that sound recording of superior court proceedings 
constituted an "official" record and, therefore, state funds could not be spent to support 
electronic recording of superior court proceedings. Under this Article's analysis of the 
applicable statutes and case law, the Judicial Council could allocate funds statewide for 
the maintenance and operation of electronic recording equipment to provide a record of 
proceedings, so long as the record is not the official record. For political reasons, 
however, the Council has moved away from electronic recording by increasing the 
allocation of funds earmarked for the ER/Verbatim Reporting Conversion Program. 
238. The issue whether a county or county superior court has the authority to charge 
a user fee for court services turns on whether the Legislature has "so fully covered by 
general law matters relating to fees ... that it must be considered a matter of state 
concern." Hogoboom v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 254, 257 (Ct. App. 1996). In 
Hogoboom, the Second District Court of Appeal held that "the Legislature has 
preempted the right of a superior court to charge fees for family law and domestic 
violence mediation other than those specifically enumerated by statewide statute." Id. 
Hogoboom was distinguished by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Lu v. Superior 
Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1997). In Lu, the court rejected petitioner's 
contention that Hogoboom prohibits the Orange County Superior Court from requiring 
petitioner to pay a fee to a discovery referee appointed by the court. Lu confined 
Hogoboom's holding to the imposition of "a fee for the use of court operated mediation 
facilities in family law and domestic violence cases." Id. at 566. The court stated: 
The [Hogoboom] court based its holding upon the conclusion state law 
preempted the field of fees which may be charged by courts in the areas of 
family law and domestic violence .... Hogoboom is also based on Government 
Code section 68070, subdivision (a)(!) which prohibits a court from enacting 
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operate and maintain its video recording equipment.239 Los Angeles 
County Superior Court could not finance its sound recording system 
with county funds."0 
IACRAA left undecided the legal status of an electronic record for 
appeal purposes."' However, as correctly noted by the fourth appellate 
district's unpublished opinion in Gandall v. Grimes,"' no appellate rule 
local rules which impose "any ... charge ... upon any legal proceeding .... " 
The court noted acts by the conciliation court are statutorily classified as 
"proceedings," and mediation is statutorily required in cases involving issues 
of custody or visitation. Neither condition exists here. 
Id. ( citations omitted). A user fee charged to litigants for electronic recording services 
provided by a superior court is not a "charge ... upon [a] legal proceeding." CAL. 
Gov'T CODE § 68070(a)(l) (West Supp. 1999). Furthermore, the Legislature has not 
preempted the superior courts from choosing to employ electronic recording devices to 
prepare a verbatim record, see supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text, and, 
therefore, has not preempted the superior courts from charging a user fee to cover the 
cost of providing that service to litigants. 
239. The Orange County Superior Court's former practice of spending locally-
generated revenue to fund electronic recording does not violate Judge Garcia's 
injunction, which bars the expenditure of state funds to electronically record court 
proceedings. Judge Garcia's judgment binds only the Judicial Council and the Alameda 
County Superior Court. Although paragraph four of the injunction restrains the Judicial 
Council "from authorizing and from causing the expenditure of public funds" to use 
electronic recording to prepare the "official verbatim record," California Court Reporters 
Ass'n v. Judicial Council, No. 728173-6 at 2 (Alameda County Super. Ct. Nov. I, 1996) 
(emphasis added), the only funds the council allocates by law are state funds 
appropriated by the Legislature. See supra notes 180-86 ( concerning state trial court 
funding). The 1997 Judicial Council directive barred superior court spending of state 
funds to maintain electronic recording. See Memorandum from William C. Vickrey to 
All Presiding and Sole Judges of the Superior Courts et al., supra note 9, at 1-2. In his 
September 15, 1999 letter, William Vickrey, the Administrative Director of the Courts, 
advised the Orange County superior court, for the first time, of the council's view that 
the court's use of locally-generated revenue to support electronic recording violates 
paragraph four of the injunction that restrains the council from "authorizing or causing 
the expenditure of public funds" to support electronic recording. Letter from William C. 
Vickrey to Kathleen E. O'Leary, supra note 16, at 2. Although the Administrative 
Director requested, but did not formally direct, the Orange County Superior Court to 
stop spending locally-generated revenues to videotape the official record, this "request" 
amounts to an expansion of the council's authority to allocate state-appropriated funds to 
include control over local court spending of locally-generated revenue. The implications 
of this expansion for decentralized court administration in California are ominous. One 
of the goals of the 1997 Isenberg-Lockyer Trial Court Funding Act was to preserve 
"[l]ocal authority and responsibility of trial courts to manage day-to-day operations." 
CAL. Gov'TCODE § 7700J(a) (West Supp. 1999). 
240. See supra note I 90 and accompanying text. 
241. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 341, 350 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]e do not decide the purposes, if any, for which 
the generated electronic recording may be used, because this question is outside the 
scope of the discrete issue presented by the association's petition and evidence."). 
Despite this reservation, the court made clear that electronic recording is not inconsistent 
with statute where neither party, nor the court, requests the services of an official 
reporter. See id. at 349-50. 
242. No. 710153 (Cal. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 1998). 
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prohibits the use of electronic recordings to prove the proceedings."' 
The Gandall decision observed that California Rule of Court 4(d) of the 
Appellate Rules, "which governs the preparation of a transcript for 
appeal, simply requires that the reporter prepare and deliver to the court 
clerk a transcript of the trial proceedings and 'certify it as correct. "'244 
Although Rule 4(d) refers to a "reporter" (though not an "official" 
reporter), Gandall treated the "duly designated court transcriber" who 
prepared the transcript in that case as a "reporter" for purposes of 
satisfying the requirements of Rule 4(d).245 
In addition to Rule 4(d) of the Appellate Rules, Rule 980.5 of the 
California Rules of Court ("General Rules-All Courts"), which is 
applicable "when a court has ordered proceedings to be electronically 
recorded,"246 provides: 
A transcript prepared and certified as provided in the preceding subdivision 
[(f)], and accompanied by a certified copy of the monitor's certificate pertaining 
to each reel transcribed, is prima facie a true and complete record of the oral 
proceedings it purports to cover, and shall satisfy any requirement in these rules 
or in any statute for a reporter's transcript of oral proceedings.247 
No statute or appellate rule restricts proof of testimony and 
243. An electronic recording or electronically-derived transcript satisfies the due 
process right of a criminal defendant to "a record of sufficient completeness to permit 
proper consideration of his appeal." People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 743 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting In re Armstrong, 178 Cal. Rptr. 902, 905 (Ct. App. 1981)). 
244. Gandall, No. 710153, slip op. at 5 (Cal. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 1998) (quoting CAL. 
R. CT. 4(d)). 
245. Id. Note that the Judicial Council has the power to amend the appellate rules 
to clarify, if necessary, that a certified transcriber qualifies as a "reporter" under Rule 
4(d). In 1941, the Legislature delegated to the Judicial Council the authority to 
promulgate rules governing appellate procedure that supersede pre-existing statute. See 
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 901 (West 1980) ("The Judicial Council shall prescribe rules 
for the practice and procedure on appeal not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
title."). 
246. CAL. R. CT. 980.5(a). 
247. Id. 980.5(g). Rule 980.3, which authorized audio and video recording as a 
means of making a verbatim record in superior court, was repealed effective January 31, 
1997 pursuant to Judge Garcia's injunction. See id. 980.3 ( 1996) (repealed 1997). Rule 
980.5(g), however, is still in effect. See id. 980.5. Also see Rule 980.5(i), which 
provides that, upon stipulation of the parties, "the [ original reels or electronic copies 
thereof] satisfy the requirements in these rules or in any statute for a reporter's 
transcript." Id. 980.5(i). Pursuant to Rule 980.5(i), the fourth appellate district, which 
includes Orange County, promulgated a "Memorandum of Policy," dated May 8, 1991, 
which "approves any such stipulation if the oral proceedings recorded on video tape are 
one hour or less in duration." Memorandum of Policy, Office of the Clerk, Court of 
Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three (May 8, 1991) (on file with author). 
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proceedings in a case to the official reporter's certified transcript. 
Section 273 of the California Code of Civil Procedure merely provides 
that "[t]he report of the official reporter . . . when transcribed and 
certified as being a correct transcript of the testimony and proceedings in 
the case, is prima facie evidence of that testimony and proceedings."248 
However, by according a court reporter's certified transcript a 
presumption of accuracy, section 273 does not thereby preclude the 
admission of other forms of evidence to prove trial court testimony.249 
No statute precludes the admissibility on appeal of an electronic 
recording, or a transcript derived from electronic recording, to prove trial 
court testimony or to challenge the accuracy of any transcript derived 
from shorthand. " 0 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The CCRA decisions were wrongly decided and should either be 
disavowed or narrowly confined to their facts. The First District Court 
of Appeal-not the Legislature-fabricated without justification an 
implied statutory scheme that prevents the courts from utilizing 
increasingly advanced technologies to efficiently allocate scarce judicial 
resources and to provide litigants more affordable options to make a 
verbatim record. The First District Court of Appeal has for no justifiable 
reason thrown a monkey wrench into the wheels of progress. It is time 
to recognize and reverse or mitigate the error. 
248. CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE§ 273(a) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added). 
249. A prior iteration of section 273(a), which was not adopted, provided that the 
court reporter's "[r]eport ... shall for the purposes of making a statement upon motion 
for new trial or appeal be conclusive of the facts therein stated." Act of May 17, 1861, 
ch. 434, § 4, 1861 Cal. Stat. 497 (handwritten draft) (emphasis added) (on file with 
author). For the text from another section of this document, see supra note 56. 
250. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 341,346 (Ct. App. 1995). The court wrote: 
Section 273 does nothing more than create an evidentiary presumption .... If a 
transcribed and certified report of the official reporter or official reporter pro 
tempore is not obtainable because a request for such a record was not made 
([section] 269), then the presumption would not be available to prove what 
occurred in the proceeding. However, the absence of an official shorthand 
record would not prohibit litigants from establishing the relevant event by 
other legitimate means, such as by an admission or independent testimony. 
Conversely, the existence of an official shorthand record would not bar the 
presentation of evidence tending to demonstrate its inaccuracy. Moreover, an 
official reporter's transcript is not required in every instance to perfect an 
appeal; a settled statement or an agreed statement is, under specified terms and 
conditions, an authorized substitute. 
Id. ( citations omitted). 
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